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REGULATING CARCINOGENS IN FOOD: A
LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE FOOD
SAFETY PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
Richard A. Merrill*t
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 9, 1977, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
announced that a study in laboratory rats conducted by the Canadian government confirmed that saccharin is an animal carcinogen.• For this reason, the agency stated, the sweetener must be
banned from human food.
The FDA's announcement triggered public incredulity and
congressional demands for revision of the nation's legal framework for regulating food safety. Critics of the agency's action
focused on the much publicized Delaney Clause of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 2 They characterized this provision, which forbids the approval of any "food additive" shown to
induce cancer in man or in animals, 3 as outdated and several
critics also ridiculed the test methods used to evaluate the safety
* Daniel Caplin Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. A.B. 1959,
LL.B. 1964, Columbia University; M.A. 1966, Oxford University.-Ed.
t © Copyright Richard A. Merrill 1979. The author was Chief Counsel of the United
States Food and Drug Administration from 1975-1977. The views expressed in this Article
are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the FDA or of any agency official. An
earlier version of the Article appears as Appendix B to Food Safety in the United States,
Part 2 of the Report of the Committee for a Study of Saccharin and Food Safety Policy of
the Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences
(March 1979).
I wish to express my appreciation for the advice and helpful criticism of several
colleagues, notably Peter Barton Hutt, Stuart Pape, Marshall Shapo, and Dr. Joseph
Rodricks, and for the assistance of Mark Colley and James Davis of the Class of 1980 and
the Class of 1979, respectively, at the University of Virginia School of Law.
1. Statement of Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs (March
9, 1977) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 301-92 (1976)[hereinafter cited as "the Act"].
3. The original Delaney Clause appears in section 409(c) of the Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c)(3)(A) (1976), and reads as follows:
Provided, that no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate
for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal. . . .
As subsequently explained in more detail, functionally identical language appears in
the provisions of the Act dealing with color additives and drugs administered to animals
that are used to produce human food. See notes 44-45 infra and accompanying text.

171

172

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:171

of food ingredients. 4 Reacting to these criticisms and to the public's apparent indignation at the imminent abolition of the only
non-nutritive sweetener approved in this country for use in foods,
Congress in late 1977 enacted the Saccharin Study and Labeling
Act. 5 This legislation forbade any FDA action against saccharin
for eighteen months and directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to arrange for separate studies of the safety and
benefits of saccharin and of the current laws regulating food
safety. The latter study and a major part of the former were
subsequently undertaken by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences.
The studies which Congress mandated, to be accompanied
by the recommendations of the Secretary of HEW, 6 are likely to
generate a fundamental reexamination of the nation's current
food safety policies. This Article attempts to aid this inquiry by
explaining the requirements of the present law. The Article describes the several statutory provisions that govern the regulation
of food constituents and analyzes the FDA's implementation of
them. Its primary objective is to provide a common starting place
for discussion of the contours of future policy. A subsequent article will examine in detail various approaches to regulating risks
posed by food and recommend specific reforms of the present law.
Readers should be advised that the Article starts from the
premise that many features of the present law are outdated and
require revision. In that sense, the Article may lack objectivity. I
have conscientiously attempted, however, to reserve judgment
about the directions of future policy and to assure that my description and analysis are historically accurate.
A continuing refrain in the furor over saccharin was the claim
that the law dictates an overreaction to some trivial risks while
allowing much graver hazards-cigarette smoking is the recurrent
4. For descriptions of the reaction, see, e.g., The Great Saccharin Snafu, CONSUMER
REP., July 1977, at 410; Demkovich, Saccharin's Dead, Dieters Are Blue, What Is Congress
Going To Do?, NATL. J., June 4, 1977, at 856; Wolff, 0/ Rats and Men, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 88; Hines & Randal, Behind the Saccharin Uproar, THE
PROGRESSIVE, June 1977, at 13. Epitomizing the exaggerated reaction of many nonecientists was the proposal of Congressman Andrew Jacobs to amend the law to permit the
continued sale of saccharin accompanied by the warning: "The Canadians have determined saccharin is dangerous to your rat's health." See Cancer and Your Sweet Tooth,
NEW REPUBLIC, March 26, 1977, at 7, 8.
5. Pub. L. No. 95-203, 91 Stat. 1451 (codified in sections of21 U.S.C.A. (West 1977)).
For discussions of Congress's motives, see H.R. REP. No. 658, 95th Cong., let Sees. 6-11
(1977); S. REP. No. 353, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-10 (1977).
6. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203, § 2, 91 Stat. 1451 (1977)
(codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(n) (West Supp. 1978)).
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example-to remain uncontrolled. As the Article demonstrates,
the aggregation of statutory provisions governing food safety represents a patchwork of divergent, sometimes carefully considered
but as often offhand, legislative policies which invite inconsistent
treatment of comparable risks. The Delaney Clause illustrates
this general characteristic, not because it produces controversial
results, but because it applies inconsistently, without regard to
the actual risks posed or the benefits provided by various classes
of food constituents. The unequivocal instruction of the Delaney
Clause magnifies the practical significance of the distinctions
among categories of food constituents that the law now recognizes.7 These distinctions are the product of the sedimentary process by which the current law, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, has been created. Beginning in 1938, 8 Congress has on
a half dozen occasions authorized the FDA (or its predecessors)
to deal with specified categories of food hazards-addressing,
first, pesticide residues; then food additives generally; later, color
additives; and finally drugs used in the production of food animals.9 Typically, Congress has added new provisions without replacing, and often without modifying, those already in the law.
Furthermore, it has often failed to explain how the new standards
mesh with the old.
While the importance of historical context in explaining the
enactment and implementation of several provisions in the Act
invites a chronological treatment, the practical implications of
the Act's disparate treatment of different classes of food constituents can better be understood by considering the categories that
constitute the FDA's jurisdiction. The legislator evaluating what
kind of food-safety legislation should be enacted is probably more
interested in how the law now operates than in how it came to
7. See R. Kingham, Statutory and Administrative Theories by Which FDA Avoids
Applying the Delaney Clause (Nov. 10, 1977)(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
8. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 717, ch. 675,
§ 402(a), 52 Stat. 1046 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1976)) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938).
9. See in historical sequence, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra
note 8; Act of July 22, 1954, Pub. L. No. 518, ch. 559, 68 Stat. 511 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 346a (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Pesticide Residues Amendment of 1954); Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 4, 72 Stat. 1785 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 348 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Food Additives Amendment of 1958); Color Additive
Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, tit. I, § 103(b), 74 Stat. 399 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 376 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Color Additives Amendments of 1960); and
Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-399, § lOl(b), 82 Stat. 343 (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 360b (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Animal Drug Amendments qf 1968).
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be. Accordingly, this Article follows legal categories in describing
how the Act and the FDA regulate food safety. Most of these
categories are defined by the origin of food constituents, i.e., how
the constituents become part of food.
The main part of the Article, Part III, analyzes the legal
standards applicable to these several categories of food constituents. First, however, Part II surveys the Act's food-safety provisions and discusses the origin and interpretation of the Delaney
Clause, the provision that triggered the FDA's action against saccharin and that is the focus of the current debate over food safety
policy.
II.
A.

STATUTORY OVERVIEW

The Food-Safety Provisions of the Act
1.

The 1938 Act and Its Precursor

The first federal statute governing food safety, the Food and
Drugs Act of 1906, declared adulterated any food that contained
"any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient
which may render such article injurious to health." 10 The early
law did not mention hazards posed by constituents other than
those ''added" to food, 11 a term not defined in the statute but
understood to embrace substances used as ingredients or intentionally applied during processing. When Congress wrote the
present Act in 1938, it wanted to expand the 1906 law's controls
over toxicants in food. Accordingly, without apparent limitation
to "added" substances, section 402(a)(l) of the Act 12 declares
adulterated any food that "bears or contains any poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health."
Almost as an afterthought, however, Congress qualified this standard as it applies to food constituents that are not added: "[B]ut
in case the substance is not an added substance such food shall
not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of
such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious
to health." 13 The 1938 Act thus retained the distinction between
substances that are "added" and those that are not, but, like the
1906 law, neglected to define "added."
10. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938),
11. Id.§ 7.
12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra note 8, § 402(a)(l) (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976)).
13. Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of this provision, see note 59 infra.
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The statutory standard for non-added toxicants has remained unchanged since 1938; the "ordinarily injurious" test is
still the legal measure of whether a substance that occurs naturally in foods, e.g., nitrites in spinach, adulterates the food. Congress has, however, made several changes in the law governing
added constituents of food. In the 1938 Act itself, Congress recognized that certain added toxicants in foods required special treatment. In section 406, 14 it empowered the FDA to establish tolerances for added poisonous or deleterious substances whose occurrence in food "cannot be avoided" or whose use is "necessary"
to produce the food. In substance, Congress authorized the FDA
to license the use of some potentially toxic substances in food,
apparently in recognition of their utility or of the importance of
foods from which they cannot practicably be eliminated. Congress's primary objective apparently was to permit the continued
use of pesticides on many agricultural commodities.
·
With the passage of the 1938 Act, therefore, federal law regulated toxicants in foods under three different standards: (1) section 402(a)(l)'s ''ordinarily injurious" standard applied to constituents that were not added; (2) section 402(a)(l)'s "may render
injurious" test applied to added constituents that were neither
necessary or unavoidable; and (3) added constituents whose use
was "necessary in the production of a food" or whose occur-.
rence was "unavoidable by good manufacturing practice" were
eligible for tolerance setting under section 406.
·
2. Post-1938 Amendments to the Act

The original triad of controls has been complicated by subsequent amendments to the 1938 Act. Each amendment deals with
one category of the broad class of "added" food constituents and
empowers the FDA to limit the use, or the occurrence, of potentially toxic substances in or on food. The first of these amendments was the Pesticide Residues Amendment of 1954, now section 408 of the Act. 15 This provision was intended to complement
the authority then residing in the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to register pesticides for use in the United
States. The amendment provides, in substance, that a raw agricultural commodity shall be deemed adulterated if it bears any
14. 21 u.s.c. § 346 (1976).
15. Pesticide Residues Amendment of 1954, supra note 9. Section 408 is codified at
21 U.S.C. § 346a (1976).
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residue of a pesticide that does not conform to a tolerance established under section 408, 16 and details an elaborate procedure for
establishing tolerances. 17
.In 1958, Congress carved out for special treatment another
category of added constituents of food. The Food Additives
Amendment, section 409 of the Act, 18 establishes a licensure
scheme, similar in concept to that for pesticide residues, for substances intended to be used as ingredients in formulated foods.
The amendment also applies to substances that, through use in
articles such as packaging which contact food, become or can
"reasonably be expected" to become components of food. 19 A food
that contains a food additive whose use the FDA has not approved as "safe," or that contains an approved food additive in a
quantity exceeding limits specified by the agency, is adulterated
under section 402(a)(2)(C) of the Act. 20 By congressional design,
the Food Additives Amendment does not apply to all intentionally added ingredients in food or to all substances that may migrate to food. The two most important exceptions are substances
whose use in food is "generally recognized as safe by qualified
experts"-an exception embracing a large number of substances,
such as sugar and salt-and substances that either the FDA or
the USDA "sanctioned" for use in food prior to 1958. 21
In 1960, Congress addressed the more limited problem of
substances used to color foods, drugs, cosmetics, and medical
devices. 22 Colors derived from coal tar dyes had been regulated
under a "harmless per se" standard, 23 which many could not
meet, while other food colors had been regulated under the general safety provisions of the Act, notably section 402(a)(l). Unlike
the Food Additives Amendment, 24 the Color Additive Amendments2.5 apply to all substances used to impart color to food; the
16. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)-(b) (1976).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)-(h) (1976) and text accompanying notes 103-05 infra.
18. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, supra note 9. Section 409 is codified at 21
u.s.c. § 348 (1976).
19. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, supra note 9, § 2 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(s) (1976)).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1976).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976). For a detailed discussion of the Food Additives Amend•
ment, see text accompanying notes 113-39 infra.
22. See Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9.
23. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra note 8, § 406(b) (re•
pealed 1960). For a detailed discussion of the FDA's implementation of this provision, see
Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153 (1958).
24. See text at note 18 supra.
25. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 101 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(t) (1976)).
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amendments do .not except colors that are recognized by experts
as safe or that were approved for use prior to 1960. The amendments require FDA approval, or "listing," for any use of a color. 26
A food that bears or contains a color additive whose use in food
the FDA has not approved, or whose use deviates from the terms
of any approval, is adulterated under section 402(c) of the Act. 27
The most recent modification of the 1938 Act that is relevant
in this context was part of the Animal Drug Amendments of
1968. 28 After 1958, drugs administered to food-producing animals
were regulated under a combination of statutory provisions-under section 409 as well as section 505 for drugs that were
administered directly to animals and that "could reasonably be
expected" to leave residues in human food, and under section 409
alone for compounds incorporated in animal feeds. 29 In 1968, Congress sought to simplify the procedure for evaluating drugs used
in food-producing animals by prescribing a unified licensure system under section 512. 30 Under the amended Act, no animal drug
that is likely to leave residues in edible tissue of livestock may
be used, nor may food containing residues be marketed, without
prior FDA approval. 31
Thus, by 1968 Congress had divided the broad class of added
constituents of human food into several categories, each subject
to special regulatory requirements. Broadly speaking, Congress
required that individual substances be presented to the FDA for
approval prior to use, and that the agency find a substance safe
for human consumption when used as proposed. As will be evident, however, this general mandate has been expressed in different statutory terms, which have not only contributed to the appearance of inconsistency in the regulation of food safety, but
have exaggerated the significance of the initial classification of
substances.
An instructive illustration derives from the fact that the four
categories of food constituents given special attention by Con26. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 706(h)(l) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 376(b) (1976)).
27. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 102(a)(2) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 342(c) (1976)).
28. Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, supra note 9 (codified principally et 21 U.S.C.
§ 360b (1976)).
29. See generally H.R. REP. No. 875, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. REP. No. 1308,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
30. Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, supra note 9, § lOl(b) (codified et 21 U.S.C.
§ 360b (1976)).
31. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(2)(D), 360b(a)(l) (1976).
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gress since 1938 do not, in the FDA's view, ex:tiaust the.class of
added constituents. Neither in 1938 nor subsequently has Congress specifically addressed the problem of environmental contaminants, such as PCBs and mercury, whose occurrence in food
is unintended and, to a large degree, uncontrollable. The agency
could have regulated such contaminants under the "may render
injurious" language of section 402(a)(l) or, indeed, under the
"ordinarily injurious" language of section 402(a)(l), but neither
provision authorizes it to determine what levels of such contaminants should be tolerated. Since the early 1970s, therefore, the
FDA has classified environmental contaminants as unavqidable
"added poisonous or deleterious substances" in order to trigger its
tolerance-setting authority under section 406. 32 The difficulty of
controlling contaminants in food and the breadth of section 406's
criteria, however, have led the agency to sanction levels of exposure to environmental contaminants that contrast sharply with
its intolerance of potentially toxic, intentional ingredients, such
as saccharin. 33 The relative difficulty of controlling human exposure in the two situations could explain this discrepant treatment
of ostensibly similar hazards without reference to the statute. But
a second explanation lies in the Delaney Clause, which codifies
the Food Additives Amendment's basic "no risk" policy for intentional food constituents, thus precluding for saccharin the kind
of inquiry that is permitted under section 406 or the pesticide
residue section. Accordingly, it is appropriate at this point to
examine the origins and interpretation of this controversial provision.

B. History and Impact of the Delaney Clause
The Delaney Clause is perhaps the most discussed, yet least
used, provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. It
became law in 1958 as part of the Food Additives Amendment,
in which Congress for the first time required premarket testing of
32. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substance in Food, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744
(1974).
33. For example, the FDA estimates that the consumption of one can each day of a
soft drink sweetened with saccharin increases the risk of bladder cancer of between zero
and four in 10,000. See Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995, 20,001 (1977). By
contrast, the risk of cancer associated with average consumption of products bearing
permitted levels of aflatoxin contamination is, by the agency's own estimate based on
animal studies, somewhere between 240 and 1100 per 100,000 population. See Assessment
of Estimated Risk Resulting from Aflatoxins in Consumer Peanut Products and Other
Food Commodities 2 (Food and Drug Administration Report, January 19, 1978),
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most intentional food ingredients. 34 Prior to 1958, the Act controlled the safety of food constituents primarily through section
402(a)'s dual proscriptions against distribution of adulterated
food. 35 These proscriptions were enforced through court action,
usually seizures, instituted by the Department of Justice upon
the FDA's recommendation. The agency could not require manufacturers to test the safety of food constituents, 36 and had never
formally exercised its authority under the original section 406 to
prescribe tolerances for potentially toxic chemicals in food. 37 The
Food Additives Amendment thrust the FDA squarely into the
business of licensing food ingredients by requiring the agency to
determine whether any "food additive" was safe for its intended
use. 38
.
Stimulated by hearings chaired by Congressman James Delaney of New York, 39 the Food Additives Amendment was the
product of lengthy congressional consideration of proposals to
regulate chemicals in food. The investigating subcommittee's
work led first to the passage in-1954 of the amendment permitting
the FDA to establish t9lerances for pesticide resjdues on raw agricultural commodities. 40 The Food Additives Amendment, en34. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976). See C. DUNN, LEGISLATIVE RECORD OF 1958 Foon
ADDITIVES AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL FooD, DRUG, AND CosMFmc ACT (CCH Food Law Institute Series 1958).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l)-(a)(2) (1976).
36. Pesticide residues on raw agricultural commodities were an exception to this
general statement. In 1954, Congress had established a system for "licensing" pesticide
residues that had been shown to be safe. Pesticide Residue Amendments of 1954, supra
note 9 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1976)). See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1976); Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food, 39 Fed.
Reg. 42,743, 42,744 (1974).
38. Section 409(c) of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, supra note 9, provides:
(c)(l) The Secretary shall(A) by order establish a regulation • • • prescribing, with respect to one or
more proposed uses of the food additive involved, the conditions under which
such additive may be safely used • . . .
(3) No such regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation of the data before the
Secretary(A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food additive, under the
conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe: Provided, that
no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found . . . , after tests which
are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of good additives, to induce
cancer in man or animal • • . •
·
' 39. Hearings Before the House Select Comm. To Investigate the Use of Chemicals in
Foods and Cosmetics, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. and 82d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1950-1952)
(popularly known as the "Delaney Committee" hearings); see H.R. REP. No. 2356, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
40. Pesticide Residue Amendments of 1954, supra note 9.
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acted four years later, was addressed mainly to intentional food
ingredients. The clause that bears Congressman Delaney's name
was not part of the legislation introduced in the House, 41 but was
an amendment from the House floor after the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, on behalf of the FDA, withdrew
its objection that the clause was redundant. 42
The Delaney Clause now appears in three provisions of the
Act: the 1958 Food Additives Amendment (now Section
409(c)(3)(A)), 43 the Color Additive Amendments of 1960 (now section 706(b)(5)(B)), 44 and the Animal Drug Amendments of 1968
(now section 512(d)(l)(H)). 45 While the Clause's three versions
differ slightly in language, 46 their basic thrust is similar-to prevent the addition to food of any substance that has been shown
41. H.R. 13254, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
42. 104 CONG. R.Ec. 17,412, 17,415 (1958). The letter from the Department withdrawing the agency's objection to the Delaney Clause stated in part:
The widespread interest in cancer led to suggestions that the food additives
legislation should mention the disease by name and forbid the approval of any
substance that is found upon test to cause cancer in test animals. This Department
is in complete accord with the intent of these suggestions • • • . H.R. 132541 as
approved by [the] committee, will accomplish this intent . . ••
To single out one class of diseases for special mention would be anomalous and
could be misinterpreted. Hence, . . . we chose general language that would restrain
any use of any additive that would have an adverse effect on the public health.
At the same time, if it would serve to allay any lingering apprehension on the
part of those who desire an explicit statutory mandate on this point, the Department would interpose no objection to appropriate mention of cancer in food additives legislation.
Id.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1976).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(l)(H) (1976).
46. All three provisions prohibit the use of substances in products that may be swallowed if those substances are shown to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal or
are shown to induce cancer by other appropriate tests. Thus, tests in which an additive is
administered by a route other than ingestion must be determined, in the first instance by
the FDA, to be "appropriate" before the Delaney Clause applies. The clause applicable
to color additives bars the approval of a carcinogenic color for any use "which will or may
result in ingestion of all or part of such additive." This language leaves open the possibility
that a carcinogenic color additive could be used to enhance the appearance of certain parts
of foods (e.g., husks, rinds, shells) ifit were certain the color would not contaminate edible
portions of the food.
The Food Additives Amendment permits the approval of a carcinogenic additive for
use in animal feed if the additive will neither adversely affect the animals nor leave any
measurable residue in edible portions of slaughtered animals or in food yielded by living
animals. A similar exception is made for carcinogenic animal drugs which neither harm
animals nor leave residues in food products derived from treated animals. See 21 U.S.C.
348(c)(3)(A) (1976). This exception to the Delaney Clause is explored in detail in the text
at notes 225-50, infra.
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to induce cancer in man or laboratory animals. The language of
section 409(c)(3)(A) is exemplary:
No such regulation [authorizing use of a food additive] shall issue
if a fair evaluation of the data before the Secretary(A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food additive, under the conditions of use to be specified in the regulation,
will be safe: Provided, that no additive shall be deemed to be safe
if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or
if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation
of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal. . . .47

This language seems unequivocal, and certain consequences
of the Clause are obvious. It accords the same-decisive-weight
to evidence that a substance induces cancer in animals as to
evidence of cancer in man. (Accordingly, when this Article refers
to a carcinogen, or to a finding of carcinogenicity, it assumes,
unless otherwise noted, that the characterization is based on one
or more experiments in laboratory animals. Such experiments
have become the primary mode for evaluating the safety of food
constituents.) In addition, the Delaney Clause allows no room for
consideration of dose; it presumes, as a matter of law, that no
level of exposure to an animal carcinogen can be .considered safe. 48
However, several critical terms in the Clause are undefined, including terms-such as "induce," "cancer," and "tests·appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives" 49-that are
47. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976).
48. During hearings on the Color Additive Amendments, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Arthur Flemming endorsed the conclusion of a National Cancer Institute
report: "No one at this time can tell how much or how little of a carcinogen would be
required to produce cancer in any human being, or how long it would take the cancer to
develop." Color Additives: Hearings on H.R. 7624 and S. 2197 Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1960). He went on to state,
We have no basis for asking Congress to give us discretion to establish a safe
tolerance for a substance which definitely has been shown to produce cancer when
added to the diet oftest animals. We simply have no basis on which such discretion
could be exercised because no one can tell us with any assurance at all how to
establish a safe dose of any cancer-producing substances.
Id. at 62, See Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in
the Formulation of Public Health Policies, 62 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1084 (1974); Turner, The
Delaney Anticancer Clause: A Model Environmental Protection Law, 24 VAND. L. R.Ev.
889 (1971).
49. "[T]he opposition to inclusion of an anticancer clause arises largely out of a
misunderstanding of how this provision works. It allows the Department and its scientific
people full discretion and judgment in deciding whether a substance has been shown to
cause cancer . . . ." Color Additives: Hearings on H.R. 7624 and S. 2197 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 501 (1960) (statement
of HEW Secretary Arthur S. Flemming).
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said to permit the FDA to exercise scientific judgment in evaluating foqd additives. Thus, for example, the statute does not indicate whether in evaluating an animal experiment the FDA should
consider both benign and malignant tumors, or whether an additive should be considered to "induce cancer" when it is associated
with an increase in tumors, even though carcinogenesis is thought
to result from some predisposing condition that the additive has
simply exacerbated. These are issues about which scientists disagree and which the FDA has refrained from attempting to resolve by rules or administrative guidelines. Debate also often
arises over the appropriateness of particular tests to determine
whether a food additive induces cancer in laboratory animals. 50
Thus, although the policy of the Delaney Clause is clear, scientific judgment has played, and apparently was intended to play,
an important role in the policy's application.
The current debate over the Delaney Clause, however, does
not concern its interpretation but its basic premises and potentially dramatic consequences. 51 My objective is not to document
or to defend the judgments of the FDA scientists who assess the
50. Controversy continues to rage over the appropriateness of experiments in which
laboratory animals are fed large doses of a substance to compensate for their short life
span and for the relatively small number of animals that can practicably be included in
a single experiment. Congressman James G. Martin (R.-N.C.) was extremely critical of
the rodent studies on which the FDA relied in proposing a ban on saccharin:
[S)accharin causes no significant increase in cancer of the test rats if they were
fed massive overdoses of it every day from the moment of birth, and • . • no
significant increase in bladder cancer resulted from exposure where the rat and its
pregnant mother were fed 2 percent of their diet, that is 1 gram of saccharin per
kilogram of body weight, daily. Thus, only with the "double whammy," of 2.5
grams per kilogram daily for two generations, was there a significant effect.
That does not translate into much of a risk to humans.
123 CONG. REc. Hll,066 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1977). Mr. Martin went on to argue that
[t]he carcinogenic effect [is] perhaps due to the action of that overdose of saccharin as being a physical irritant, one which would increase the raw sensitivity of
the rat's bladder tissue. The mechanism may be a secondary effect in which this
massive, extreme overdose would affect the rat's detoxification mechanism. Either
way [cancer] only occurs at a near lethal overdose.
123 CONG. REc. H 6414 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1977). See Martin Criticizes Conclusion.~ of MIT
Study, Fooo CHEMICAL NEWS Aug. 21, at 29.
51. In practice, the FDA has rarely relied solely on the Delaney Clause in attempting
to ban or restrict exposure to carcinogenic food ingredients. Between the early 1950s and
1977, the agency forbade the use of 14 food constituents on the ground that they caused
cancer in laboratory animals. (In only three instances-those involving Flectol H, Chronaline, and saccharin-did it expressly invoke the Delaney Clause.) This total does not
include more recent FDA actions dealing with chloroform and acrylonitrile. See
Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriation.~ for 1975, pt. 8,
Hearing,q Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriation,q, 93d Cong., 2d Sess,
214-21 (1974).
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carcinogenicity of food additives. For present purposes, it suffices
to record that the agency exercises judgment in combining malignant and benign tumors, and is usually unpersuaded by attempts
to explain that an increase in tumors was not "induced" by the
test compound. 52 It routinely insists that ingredients be tested
according to current scientific standards, but it must nevertheless
often make decisions on the basis of studies that fall short of this
criterion. 53 On occasion it has discounted findings of carcinogenicity on the ground that the test procedures were not appropriate. 54
Ordinarily, the FDA would reject as inappropriate any test of a
food additive administered by a route other than ingestion'. 55
In summary, the Delaney Clause leaves the FDA room for
scientific judgment in deciding whether its conditions are met by
a food additive. But the clause affords no flexibility to determine
ultimate regulatory consequences once FDA scientists determine
that these conditions are satisfied. A food additive that has been
found in an appropriate test to induce cancer in laboratory animals may-not be approved for-use in food for any purpose, at any
level, regardless of any "benefits" that it might provide. And if
an approved food additive whose benefits have become widely
accepted is found to induce cancer in animals, the FDA must end
its use. 58 Evidence that an additive causes other types of adverse
52. The FDA allowed the use of the nutrient selenium in animal feed although some
studies indicated that it is a potential carcinogen. The agency's rationale was that at
certain dosages the additive induced in test animals a pathologic change (i.e., liver damage) which in tum led to cancer. The FDA maintained that the anticancer clause did not
preclude approving the additive for use at levels safely below the dose at which pathologic
changes occur. 38 Fed. Reg. 10,458, 10,459-60 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 1355 (1974).
53. 21 C.F.R. § 170.20(a) (1978) states:
In reaching a decision on any petition filed under section 409 of the act, the Commissioner will give full consideration to the specific biological properties of the
compound and the adequacy of the methods employed to demonstrate safety for
the proposed use, and the Commissioner will be guided by the principles and
procedures for establishing the safety of food additives stated in current publicatons
of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council . . . .
See FDA Advisory Comm. on Protocols for Safety Evaluation, Panel on Carcinogenesis
Report on Cancer Testing in the Safety Evaluation of Food Additives and Pe.~ticides, 20
TOXICOL. & APP. PHARMAC0L. 419 (1971).
54. This was the basis of the FDA's recent rejection of a petition by the Health
Research Group to revoke approval for several color additives. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,990 (1978).
See Acrylonitrile Copolymers Used To Fabricate Beverage Containers; Final Decision, 42
Fed. Reg. 48,528 (1977).
55. See note 53 supra; 21 C.F.R. § 500.80(b) (1978); Color Additives: Provisional
Regulations; Postponement of Closing Date, 42 Fed. Reg. 6992, 6994 (1977).
56. See Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996 (1977). The Act does not specify
how quickly the FDA must act to ban an approved additive that is later found to be
carcinogenic. In this silence, the agency argued unsuccessfully in corre.spondence with the
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effects, by contrast, does not automatically dictate disapproval if
the FDA can conclude, under the general standards of the Food
Additives Amendment, that the conditions of the additive's use
pose no significant ·human risk.
The reader should not conclude from this summary, however,
that Congress has unequivocally forbidden the introduction or
presence of carcinogens in foods. As the previous section revealed,
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act incorporates several different,
not always consistent provisions designed to assure that foods do
not contain harmful constituents. Some of these provisions accord dispositive weight to a finding of carcinogenicity, i.e., to a
finding that a substance has induced cancer in laboratory animals, but others prescribe more general criteria that do not differentiate between the induction of cancer and other risks to health
and that vary in the degree to which they permit the agency to
consider factors offsetting such risks. The result is a patchwork
of regulatory approaches that has produced seemingly irreconcilable decisions respecting the use or occurrence of specific food
constituents.
Part ill examines the regulatory standards applicable to each
of the several classes of food constituents recognized by the Act.
I have used "constituent" to embrace any substance that is or
becomes a part of food. The term does not appear in the Act,
which, as the reader is now aware, divides food constituents into
numerous categories-such as "food additives" or "pesticide residues"-to which special rules apply. Except when "constituent"
is used in an undifferentiated fashion to apply to any or all of
these categories, the Article uses the Act's terminology.
ill.

STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR REGULATING CONSTITUENTS

OF HUMAN

FooD

As we have seen, Congress's current food safety "policy"
must be distilled from the several overlapping provisions of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act enacted in or since 1938. These
various provisions focus either on the way in which constituents
Department of Justice about the additive sodium nitrite that the ingredient's use could
be phased out while efforts are made to find an alternative means of preventing botulism.
See Culliton & Waterfall, Nitrites-To Ban or Not To Ban?, 1978 BRIT, MED, J. 1613;
Smith, Ever So Cautiously, the FDA Moves Toward a Ban on Nitrites, 201 SCIENCE 887
(1978). See also Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, March 30, 1979 (announcing the Department of Justice's rejection of this argument). It is clear, however, that § 409(c)(3)(A) precludes the FDA from allowing any use
whatever of a new additive that is shown to induce cancer, regardless of its utility.
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become part of food, e.g., as residues of pesticides, or on the
functions they serve, e.g., color additives, rather than on the risks
to health they present or the benefits they provide. Each provision addresses these two elements-if at all-largely without regard to the treatment accorded other classes of food constituents.
For purposes of discussion, constituents of food can be divided into four general categories based upon their source or origin. Some of these categories in turn include subclasses of constituents that are themselves subject to distinct statutory standards.
The following sections describe and analyze the FDA's current
interpretation of specific statutory provisions, an interpretation
that in some instances may be disputable. Where the agency's
position remains untested or differs from an earlier interpretation, the Article notes this fact and discusses any significant differences.
The four broad categories are:
A. Natural constituents of agricultural commodities, e.g.,
ascorbic acid in oranges, nitrates in spinach.
B. Environmental contaminants of food, which the FDA
has characterized as "added" on the theory that they are not
inherent even though they may in some measure be unavoidable
in some foods, e.g., PCBs in fish, mycotoxins in or on many
grains.
C. Substances used intentionally as food ingredients, e.g.,
salt, saccharin, Red Dye No. 2, sodium nitrite.
D. Substances that become constituents of human food
through their intentional use for other purposes, which may or
may not be food-related, e.g., food-packaging materials, animal
drugs, and pesticides.
This division of food constituents into discrete categories is
potentially misleading, for some constituents fall into more than
one category. Nitrate, for example, occurs naturally in many vegetables and has been intentionally added to some processed
meats. Ascorbic acid is a natural constituent of oranges, but may
also be added to processed foods to provide Vitamin C. Furthermore, it can be difficult to judge which category a given constituent of a specified food fits. DDT residues in fish may now be
considered an unavoidable environmental contaminant, but their
original occurrence can be attributed to human efforts to control
agricultural pests. Before DDT was banned as a pesticide, tolerances had been established for its residues on agricultural commodities in accordance with section 408 of the Act, and some
tolerances remain in effect because DDT's persistence in the envi-
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ronment makes its presence in some foods unavoidable.
The following sections outline the current statutory criteria
applicable to each of the four categories of food constituents and
briefly describe the legal processes by which these criteria: are
applied. In each instance specific attention is given to the regulatory significance of a finding that a constituent induces cancer in
experimental animals.
A. Natural Food Constituents

Section 402{a){l) of the Act57 sets forth the safety standard
applicable to naturally occurring food constituents. Under this
provision a food is adulterated
[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance
which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance
is not an added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of such substance in such
food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health . . . .as

The legislative history of the 1938 Act, in which this language first
appeared, does not aid its interpretation. 59 Congress evidently
57. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (emphasis added). The second clause of § 4O2(a)(l) concerns the manner in which a substance becomes part of food (i.e., its natural occurrence),
not its character. A substance is considered naturally occurring when it is an inherent
constituent of a food marketed without processing, even though it may be identical to a
compound synthesized in a laboratory. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food,
39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744 (1974). Similarly, the category of food additives is not confined
to substances synthesized by man. An apple used in making applesauce would be a food
additive if it were not generally recognized as safe, while a synthesized chemical preservative might be so well-tested that it would be so recognized.
59. The 1906 Act declared food adulterated "[i]f it contain any added poisonous or
other added deleterious ingredients which may render such article injurious to health."
Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (emphasis added).
Most of the early bills to reform the law would have changed that language to define food
as adulterated "[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which
may render it dangerous to health." S. 2000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(l) (introduced
Jan. 4, 1934); S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(l) (introduced Feb. 19, 1934 and as
revised and reported from committee, reprinted in 78 CONG. REc. 4567-73 (1934)); S. 5,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(l) (introduced Jan. 4, 1935); S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3O1(a)(l) (reported in the House May 31, 1935); S. 5, 75th Cong., 1st Seas. § ll(a)(l)
(introduced Jan. 6, 1937). The language Congress ultimately adopted to deal specifically
with naturally occurring adulterants appeared unexplained in a bill prepared by a subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and reported to the
House on August 14, 1938 as a substitute for the bill (S.5) passed by the Senate several
months earlier. While the Commitee's report, H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1938), does not indicate why this wording was added, the legislative record of the earlier
bills may suggest an answer.
The earliest proposed bills had deleted the word "added" from the language of the
1906 Act to allow the FDA to regulate any food that might be dangerous, whether the
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was aware that some foods naturally cont~in substances that, if
consumed in excess, can be harmful, and quite clearly it wanted
a demanding standard for FDA enforcement. The provision
makes no specific mention of the risk of cancer, and not surprisingly, there is no evidence that Cqngress anticipated that a natural food might itself cause cancer or-a more common occurrence-be found to contain naturally a substance that induces
cancer when fed to laboratory animals.
Judicial construction of the "ordinarily injurious" standard
has been surprisingly rare. However, the few cases, as well as the
sparse legislative history, indicate that the FDA must show that
the amount of a naturally occurring poisonous· substance is sufficient to render the food in which it occurs injurious when consumed in ordinary quantities by ordinary consumers. The leading
case, United States v. 1232 Cases of American Beauty Bra,:id
Oysters, 60 involved an FDA seizure of oysters that contained shell
deleterious constituent occurred naturally or was put in food by artifice. Federal Food.~.
Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearing on S. 2800 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The bills also substituted the word "dangerous" for "injurious."
FDA Chief Walter G. Campbell pointed out to both House and Senate committees that
during the congressional consideration of the 1906 Act, language that would have prohibited interstate transportation of any food naturally containing an "injurious" substance
had been deleted because of concern that it would outlaw foods such as coffee and tea.
Thus, the 1906 Act had been limited to foods containing added adulterants. But, Mr.
Campbell explained, the 1906 Act also left such foods as poisonous mushrooms and particularly toxic varieties of West Coast mussels, which acquire their injurious properties
naturally, beyond federal control. The word "dangerous" was therefore applied to foods
naturally containing poisonous or deleterious substances in order to differentiate "between
those products which may be injurious to health in a mild way and those that are unquestionably dangerous to health in a very definite way." Fool:ls, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941, and S.5 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1935); Food, Drugs, and
Cosmetics: Hearings on S.5 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate on Commerce, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935).
The final wording of§ 402(a)(l) returned to "injurious," but omitted "added" from
the second clause-in order to reach naturally occurring poisons. Although not spelled out
in the legislative history, the rationale of the final language may be inferred. "Injurious"
had been the standard for all FDA enforcement actions under the 1906 Act, and Congress
was reluctant to change language that the courts had already interpreted. But to prevent
draconian enforcement against foods that naturally contained a deleterious substance, the
House committee added the proviso requiring the government to prove that a substance
was harmful when consumed in ordinary quantities. In other words, the phrase appears
to have been another means of differentiating between "mildly" disturbing and
"unquestionably" dangerous nonadded substances without abandoning the familiar term,
"injurious." Statements during hearings indicate that foods such as coffee, tea, rhubarb
(which naturally contain oxalic acid), and cocoa were not to be restricted. Congress
wanted to reach only foods such as the poisonous mushrooms, mussels, and "Burma
beans" that FDA witnesses had cited as examples of foods that are highly toxic in their
natural state.
60. 43 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
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fragments which the government claimed were capable of lodging
in the esophagus or injuring the mouth. The court observed that
section 402(a)(l) contemplates that "there may be of necessity
food products containing deleterious substances." 61 It found that
the shell fragments could not be entirely removed, even though
the claimant used the most modern processing t~chniques, and
that there were no more fragments than in the products of other
processors. That the claimant had distributed over fifty million
cans without receiving any complaints about the presence of shell
fragments also influenced the court. Accordingly, it concluded,
the government had not shown the oysters to be dangerous in
ordinary use:
[Because] it is impossible to eliminate shell fragments in toto
from the product, the use of oysters as a food must be entirely
prohibited or it must be found that the presence of shell fragments
is not a deleterious substance within the meaning of the law and
must be tolerated[;] to reject oyster products as a food is unthinkable. It would be as reasonable to reject fish because of the presence of bones. 82

The court's statement assumes that notwithstanding the risk
of choking or ot~er injury from oyster shell fragments, Congress
would regard oysters as sufficiently important to preclude a finding of adulteration. While the Act does not explicitly authorize
such a rough weighing of risks and benefits, the court's assumption is consistent with the few illustrations contained in the legislative history of section 402(a)(l). The bill's proponents clearly
did not want to ban coffee, although they acknowleged that excessive consumption of caffeine could be injurious to health. Their
desire to control the marketing of mushrooms and .mussels but
not rhubarb suggests that the "ordinarily injurious" standard was
meant to permit the FDA, or a district court, to weigh the relative
dangers and importance of foods that naturally contain poisonous
constituents. 63
This does not mean that the FDA could not restrict the marketing of a food that naturally contains a constituent shown to be
an animal carcinogen. Given the current skepticism among scien61. 43 F. Supp. at 750.
62. 43 F. Supp. at 751.
63. See note 59 supra. In Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Folsom, 236 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1956), the court discerned in the legislative history of § 402(a)(l) a rough balancing
of risks and benefits. The court pointed out that in § 402(a)(l) Congress had differentiated
between added and naturally occurring poisonous substances, precluding a finding of
adulteration unless a naturally occurring substance was present in sufficient quantity to
render the food injurious when ingested in the customary fashion.
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tists about the existence of "safe" levels of any carcinogen, the
agency could contend that any exposure poses a hazard for at
least a small number of consumers. However, the FDA has never
made this argument with respect to a natural constituent of food.
The sparse case law suggests that the agency would have to demonstrate a probability of harm to some significant number of
consumers. Thus, section 402(a)(l) would appear to allow, and
perhaps require, the FDA to consider whether a naturally occurring carcinogen is present in amounts sufficient to present a serious risk. And the agency has assumed, without ever explicitly
stating, that under 402(a)(l) its assessment of seriousness of such
a risk may legitimately include some evaluation of the "benefits"
of the food itself. 64
Section 402(a)(l) is enforced primarily through seizure or
other court action. The Act does not require the distributor of a
commodity to seek approval of the safety of its natural constituents, nor does it provide a procedure for administratively withdrawing permission to market a food that naturally contains an
unsafe constituent. Theoretically, the FDA could promulgate a
regulation declaring a particular natural constituent an adulterant-as it has done with some added food constituents which had
never been "licensed. " 65 But even in such a case, the agency
would have to enforce its judgment through judicial action, and
it is unclear what weight a court would accord to the agency's
ruling. The FDA bears the burden of initiating any challenge to
the safety of a natural constituent of food. Accordingly, the FDA's
failure to initiate court action reflects, and probably places beyond executive review, its determination that a natural constituent is not present in amounts sufficient to cause harm, or that the
importance of the food outweighs the risk. 66 The Act does not
64. There is no other satisfactory explanation for the agency's understandable silence
on the subject of nitrates as natural constituents of many green vegetables. See generally
Congressional Research Service, Nitrate Food Contaminaton: A Case Study (Aug. 31,
1978) (working paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment).
65. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 189 (1978). It has attempted to impose similar limitations on
the use of specific ingredients in drugs and cosmetics. One example is chloroform, which
the agency banned from use in cosmetics because of a finding by the National Cancer
Institute that the substance induces cancer in laboratory animals. The agency relied on
§ 601(a) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. 361(a) (1976), whose language parallels the first clause of
§ 402(a)(l). In so doing, however, the agency purported to evaluate whether the risk was
outweighed by any benefit. See Chloroform as an Ingredient of Human Drug and Cosmetic
Products, 41 Fed. Reg. 26,842 (1976)(codified in 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.513, 700.18 (1978)).
66. See Public Citizen v. Schmidt, [1977] FooD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH)
1170,171.13 (D.D.C. 1976).
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impose, and the FDA has not assumed, any responsibility to announce or document such decisions.
B.

"Unavoidable," "Added" Constituents of Food

An important and increasingly larger group of food constituents are those that, although not inherent in agricultural commodities, unintentionally contaminate foods such as grains, vegetables, meat, milk, and fish during harvesting or production.
Such environmental contaminants are common;_ they include
aflatoxins on peanuts and grains, polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) in fish and milk, and mercury •in swordfish and other
marine species. Most such contaminants are considered "poisonous or deleterious" because they are toxic at some level of exposure. Some, such as PCBs, have been shown to be carcinogenic
in test animals. Aflatoxins are acknowledged animal carcinogens
and are strongly suspected of causing human cancers as well.
The FDA characterizes these and other environmental contaminants as "unavoidable, " 67 but it uses this term in a special
sense. A person who wants to eat swordfish cannot avoid finite
quantities of mercury, which apparently contaminates all of the
species. But one could "avoid" mercury by not eating swordfish
(or other foods) that are contaminated by it. 68 The FDA's characterization thus subsumes the desirability or value of some foods
containing environmental contaminants, and measures instead
the ability of manufacturers and processors to eliminate the
contamination. Under the agency's interpretation, the degree to
which such a contaminant may be "avoided" depends not only
on the levels at which it occurs but on the practicability of the
various methods by which contaminated food can be identified
and prepared for distribution or consumption. 89
While the FDA's interpretation of the "unavoidability" criterion of section 406 may be entirely consonant with Congress's
expectation, its approach to environmental contaminants should
be contrasted with the Act's treatment of direct food additives.
67. See, e.g., Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food, 39 Fed. Reg, 42,743
(1974).
68. Hutt, The Basis and Purposes of Government Regulation of Adulteration and
Misbranding of Food, 33 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 505,533.34 (1978). See Hutt, Unre.~ofoed
Issues in the Conflict Between Individual' Freedom and Government Control of Food
Safety, 33 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 558, 585-87 (1978).
69. See, e.g., Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), 42 Fed. Reg. 17,487 (1977); Aflatoxins in Shelled Peanuts and Peanut Products Used as Human Foods, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,748
(1974).
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The FDA has prudently concluded that Congress would not expect it to ban the distribution of peanuts in order to prevent
human exposure to aflatoxins, but the food additive provisions
make no allowance for the fact that saccharin is currently an
essential ingredient of low calorie soft drinks. Banning saccharin
will effectively prevent the marketing of such products altogether. Similarly, saccharin can be viewed as at least as indis~
pensable in the production of low calorie soft drinks as pesticides are in the production of most agric~ltural commodities, the
very circumstance for which Congress devised section 406.
This analysis is not simply a linguistic game. The classification of PCBs, for example, as an unavoidable environmental contaminant permits the FDA to avoid the strictures of the Delaney
Clause. The agency has concluded that the Delaney Clause does
not apply to such "unavoidable,' food contaminants for two reasons.70 First, although it considers environmental contaminants
"added" subtances within the meaning of the first clause of section 402(a)(l), 71 it acknowledges that they could not be approved
as "food additives" because they serve no purpose in food. A food
additive must perform a functional purpose, e.g., a preservative
must preserve, before it can be approved. 72 Second, the FDA has
assumed that Congress did not intend section 409 to reach constituents whose addition to, or presence in, food cannot be fully
controlled by human intervention. The Food Additives Amendment was designed to regulate ingredients used to make food and
constituents, such as packaging materials, that become part of
70. Such contaminants could fit within the Act's broad definition of"food additive,"
21 U.S.C. § 32l(s) (1976), although little in the legislative history suggests that Congress
contemplated this result, and some evidence suggests the contrary. The House Commerce
Committee report on the_1958 Food Additives Amendment stated that "accidental" additives were not included in the terms of the legislation.
The principal examples of both intentional and incidental additives are substances intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding food.
On the other hand, substances which may accidentally get into a food, as for
example, paints or cleaning solutions used in food processing plants, are not covered
by the legislation. These additives are generally referred to as "accidental additives," since these substances if properly used may not reasonably be expected to
become a component of a food or otherwise to affect the characteristics of a food.
If accidental additives do get into food, the provisions of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act dealing with poisonous and deleterious substances would be applicable.
H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1958).
71. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976).
72. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(4) (1976). See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744 (1974).
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food through intentional use for other purposes. 73 The FDA has
therefore regulated "unavoidable" food contaminants under
other provisions of the Act, either section 402(a)(l) or section
402(a)(2) augmented by section 406. As the following discussion
indicates, the interrelation of these three provisions, enacted simultaneously in 1938, poses difficult problems o( interpretation.
FDA's current construction represents an attempt to distill a unified policy out of language that defies consistent interpretation. 74
1.

Section 402(a)(l)

As was observed in Part II, section 402(a)(l) applies a more
rigorous standard to added contaminants of food than to naturally occurring poisons. The statute provides that a food is adulterated "[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious
substance which may render it injurious to health . . . .'' 76 The
addition, in the next clause, of the "ordinarily injurious" standard addressed specifically to naturally occurring deleterious
substances makes inescapable the inference that the initial clause
applies only to added toxicants.76
"
The "may render injurious" standard was carried over from
the 1906 Act. 77 Indeed, the Supreme Court's opinion in United
States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 78 a case decided under
the older law, is still the authoritative interpretation of this
phrase. In Lexington Mill, the FDA sought to condemn flour
which had been treated with nitrogen peroxide gas, small quantities of which remained on the food. The Supreme Court affirmed
a lower court ruling that the jury had been erroneously instructed
that the addition of a poisonous substance in any quantity would
render food adulterated. The Court's opinion made clear that the
"may render" standard applies not to the added constituent it73. The House Commerce Committee report on the Food Additives Amendment
states: "The legislation covers substances which are added intentionally to food • • .
[and] substances which may reasonably be expected to become a component of any food
or to affect the characteristics of any food." H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Seas. 3
(1958). See also statement quoted in note 70 supra.
74. See Poison or Deleterious Substances in Food, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743 (1974).
75. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976).
76. There is little discussion in the 1938 legislative history about the application of
§ 402(a)(l) to "added" substances. In its consideration of this section, Congress was
mainly concerned about the language it should use to reach naturally occurring dangerous
substances. See note 59 supra.
77. Compare Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of1938, supra note 8, § 402(a)(l)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976)) with Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7,
34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
78. 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
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self, but to the food that contains it; it is the food which the
government has the burden of showing "may be injurious" to
consumers. The Court also made clear, however, that the FDA
need not prove conclusively that a food containing an added poison would cause injury for that food to be condemned. Any significant possibility that the food would be injurious would satisfy
the "may render" test. Consideration could be given to the various uses of the food and to the vulnerability of individuals to
whom it might be fed, e.g., the sick, the young, or the aged. If
food, because of an added substance, "may possibly injure the
health of any of these," the statute is satisfied. If, on the other
hand, "it cannot by any possibility, when the facts are reasonably
considered, injure the health of any consumer, such [food],
though having a small addition of poisonous or deleterious ingredients, may not be condemned under the act." 79
Congress consciously sought to carry over this interpretation
when it incorporated the first clause of section 402(a)(l) in the
1938 Act. 80 The key issue under the "may render injurious" standard is the quantity of the added substance in the food. In United
States v. Commonwealth Brewing Corp., 81 the court acknowledged that in toxicology quantity is important in determining
whether or not a deleterious substance may be harmful and therefore concluded that "quantity would be the test under [section
402(a)(l)]." 82 An inquiry into level of exposure would appear to
be essential under the "ordinarily injurious" standard as well.
The two adulteration standards in section 402(a)(l) appear to be
distinguished chiefly by the greater probability of harm the government must show to restrict a natural constituent and by its
ability, under the "may render" standard, to take account of
specially vulnerable segments of the population. Under either
standard, the government must prove that the food itself probably will; or may, injure health, not merely that it contains a
poisonous substance. If the substance is not added, it must be
present in such quantities that the food is likely to be injurious
under ordinary conditions of use. If any likely use of a food con79. 232 U.S. at 411. The Supreme Court has ruled that the language interpreted in
Lexington Mill survived in the § 402(a)(l) test for adulteration. Flemming v. Florida
Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153, 161 (1958).
80. See Hearings on S. 2800 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 530-32 (1934).
81. No. 7926 (D. Mass. May 22, 1945) (reported in V. KLEINFELD & C. DUNN, FEDERAL
FooD, DRUG AND COSMETIC Acrr: JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE R.EcoRD 1938-1949, at 310,
313 (Food Law Institute Series 1949)).
82. V. KLEINFELD & C. DUNN, supra note 81, at 313.
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taining an added toxicant would pose a risk of harm, the food is
adulterated.
Because the statute imposes a more rigorous standard for
"added" substances, the FDA has historically interpreted that
term broadly. In regulations published in final form in 1977, the
agency reiterated that any substance, including natural environmental contaminants such as mercury, that is not an "inherent"
constituent of a food may be regulated as an "added" substance. 83
Furthermore, the FDA asserted, if the quantity of a constituent
.exceeds the amount that would naturally be present, e.g., because of additional absorption from the environment, the excess
quantity is an "added" substance under section 402(a)(l). 84 Any
substance incorporated in or added to a food, or used intentionally in proximity to food in a fashion that results in migration,
would obviously also fall in this category. In short, in the agency's
view, the first clause of section 402(a)(l) applies to most of the
deleterious substances that may occur in human food.
It should be emphasized that the first clause of section
402(a)(l), like the clause applicable to naturally occurring adulterants, is a prohibitory standard, not a licensing provision. To
enforce section 402(a)(l), the FDA ordinarily must locate contaminated food, conduct chemical analyses, find witnesses prepared to testify that the amount of the contaminant is potentially
harmful to some portion of consumers, and prove these facts in
court. By itself, the provision gives the agency no authority to
83. See Poisonous and Deleterious Substances in Food, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743 (1974),
42 Fed. Reg. 52,814 (1977). The legislative history is compatible with this position. Testimony during hearings on the 1938 Act indicates that any substance not "normal" or
"natural" to a food, or that was added by "artifice" in manufacture, was considered to
be "added." Hearings on S. 2800 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Seas. 529-30 (1934). The courts have generally accepted this broad reading of "added."
In United States v. 1,680,000 Pounds of White Com, No. T-4173 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1970),
the court found aflatoxin mold on com to be an "added" substance because it is "not a
natural constituent of com." Similarly, in United States v. An Article of Food Consisting
of Cartons of Swordfish, 395 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court agreed with the
FDA's contention that "the test for determining whether a substance is added is whether
it occurs naturally in the food," citing House hearings preceding the 1938 Act to support
this conclusion. Accordingly, the court held mercury in swordfish to be an "added" substance because it "is not naturally produced by [the] fish, but is acquired through its
external food supply." 395 F. Supp. at 1186. Cf. United States v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc,,
447 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (Although some mercury may occur naturally in
swordfish, the substance is "added" because about two thirds of the amount present in
swordfish is the result of pollution.)
84. United States v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (N.D. Fla.
1978).
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evaluate or approve the safety of a substance before it is "added"
to food. 85
2.

Section 402(a)(2)(A) and 406

The two clauses of section 402(a)(l) theoretically provide a
comprehensive framework for regulating food safety. Together
they cover all substances, indigenous and added, that may render
food unsafe, but they are inadequate in two important respects.
First, neither clause authorizes the FDA to assess the safety of a
constituent or of a food before consumers are exposed. Both stan'"
dards are enforced after the fact. Second, section 402(a)(l)'s
"may render injurious" standard does not appear to allow any
consideration of the benefits of an added substance or of the costs
of removing from food a substance whose occurrence producers
cannot easily control.
Although the legislative history is not fully illuminating,
Congress obviously was sensitive to this second difficulty when it
enacted the 1938 Act, for it designed two other provisions to permit the FDA to establish tolerances for added poisonous or deleterious substances that provide some benefit-either because
they cannot be avoided in some foods that are considered important or because their use contributes significantly to food production. The first, section 402(a)(2)(A), specifies that a food shall be
deemed adultered
'

if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious
substance . . . which is unsafe within the meaning of section
406 . . . .88

And the second, section 406, provides:
Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except
where such substance is required in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice shall be deemed
to be ·unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2) (A) of
section 402(a); but when such substance is so required or cannot
be so avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting
the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary
for the protection of public health, and any quantity exceeding the
85. It is true that in recent years the FDA has sometimes undertaken to issue regulations defining a substance as an adulterant under § 402(a)(l) or announcing the quantity
of a toxicant present in food that will trigger regulatory action under this standard-a socalled "action level." In this fashion the agency has attempted to reduce the burden of
demonstrating a hazard in each individual enforcement proceeding. See United States v.
Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974). Compare United States v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Fla. 1978).
86. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(A) (1976).
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limits so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of
the application of clause (2)(A) of section 402(a) . . . . In determining the quantity of such added substances to be tolerated in
or on different articles of food the Secretary shall take into account
the extent to which the use of such substance is required or cannot
be avoided in the production of each such article, and the other
ways in which the consumer may be affected by the same or other
poisonous or deleterious substances. 87

This language satisfies the requirements of section 402(a)(2), but
it does not cure the problem posed by section 402(a)(l)'s prohibition of any "added" poisonous substance that "may render" food
injurious to consumers. Congress therefore added the following
additional caveat to section 406:
While such a regulation is in effect limiting the quantity of any
such substance in the case of any food, such food shall not, by
reason of bearing or containing any added amount of such substance, be considered to be adulterated within the meaning of
clause (1) of section 402(a).88

As with many other provisions of the 1938 Act, section 406's
legislative history only intimates the kinds of "added" toxicants
Congress expected the FDA to set tolerances for. 89 Pesticides were
obviously the primary candidates. It is questionable whether
87. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra note 8, § 406, as amended
by Food Additives Amendment of 1958, supra note 9, § 3(c) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348
(1976)).
88. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra note 8, § 406 (codified at
21 u.s.c. § 346 (1976)).
89. The legislative history suggests that two major concerns motivated Congress to
modify the approach of the 1906 Act. While Congress recognized that some potentially
deleterious ingredients in food were ubiquitous, it wanted to enhance FDA control over
consumer exposure to poisonous substances in food from all sources. Agency officials
complained that the 1906 Act only allowed them to consider the consequences to health
of an added poison in a single commodity. Congress wanted to allow the FDA to include
in its consideration the extent to which consumers were exposed to a deleterious substance
from other sources as well. Hearings on S. 1944 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19 (1933). FDA officials also complained about the
burden imposed on the agency whenever it attempted to enforce the 1906 Act's prohibition
against added poisonous substances. That law required the FDA to show that the particu•
lar lot of food subjected to the enforcement proceeding contained enough added poison to
present a genuine risk to health. In each case the government had to summon outstanding
toxicologists to testify that the quantity of added poison in the food was harmful-a
cumbersome, expensive, and unpredictable process. Hearings on S. 2800 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d sess. 596 (1934).
To remedy these drawbacks, Congress chose simply to declare a good to be adulterated, and thus subject to enforcement under§ 402(a)(2), ifit contained any added poisonous or deleterious substance. The quantity of the substance and the extent to which the
food might be harmful were immaterial. The agency would only have to prove that the
substance was poisonous and that it was "added." It could then set tolerances for those
substances that were important or unavoidable in food production.
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Congress imagined that the FDA might, as it has done, use section 406 to control environmental contaminants without flatly
proscribing the marketing of contaminated foods under section
402(a)(l). 90 The point is somewhat academic, for the FDA never
attempted to establish formal tolerances for any "added" poison
until well into the 1970s. The agency attempted to control pesticide residues on raw commodities through informal administrative tolerances-levels that would cause it to initiate regulatory
action under section 402(a)(l). 91 These administrative tolerances
were apparently known to producers and distributors of foods but
were never published, much less made the subject of public rulemaking. 92
90. Legislative history about which substances would qualify for the "required" or
"unavoidable" exceptions-and thus be eligible for tolerances-is again scanty. A Senate
Report described these exceptions by example, noting that "poisonous sprays for fruits
and vegetables to protect them against insects or fungus diseases" might be required for
food production and that unavoidable contaminants might be tolerated "where purification processes cannot entirely eliminate a contaminant of raw materials, or where some
contaminant is unavoidably introduced in factory operations." S. REP. No. 646, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935). Obviously, Congress was principally concerned about pesticide
residues on raw agricultural commodities. Throughout the hearings and floor debates,
representatives of apple-producing states expressed their fear that the FDA would prescribe excessively stringent tolerances. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 4848 (1935); 83 CONG. REc.
7783-86, 7894-98 (1938). The FDA's Campbell made clear that pesticide residues would
fall within the agency's tolerance-setting authority because they were required in food
production. He asserted that many pesticides were "regarded as absolutely essential in
the production of our supply of fruits and vegetables." Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics:
Hearings on S.5 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1935)(statement of Walter G. Campbell).
Nothing in the legislative history reveals which other substances might be eligible for
tolerances. The other examples of "added" poisonous substances that the FDA wanted
authority to control included items that were not required for production or that good
manufacturing practice could avoid, such as arsenic that contaminates sugar by blowing
through open windows. Id. However, when pointedly asked whether the authority to
establish tolerances was chiefly directed at residues of pesticide sprays, Campbell replied,
Not at all . . . . They are not alone. There are a great many products in which
added deleterious substances may be found. They are being discovered every day.
We never know where we are going to fmd them. They may be found where least
suspected, due, sometimes to careless manufacturing operations, such as using lead
manufacturing equipment, and such as the deliberate addition of ethylene glycol
to frozen eggs. • . .
Hearings on S. 1944 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Seas. (1933), reprinted in C. DUNN, FEDERAL Foon, DRUG, AND COSMETIC Ac:r: A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 1251 (1938).
91. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744, (1974).
92. Id. On a casual reading §§ 402(a)(l) and (a)(2)(A) of the Act appear redundant.
Section 402(a)(l) provides that an added poison will adulterate food only if present in
quantities that may pose a risk to health. It contemplates that the FDA must establish the requisite degree of danger for any good by evidence in court. By contrast,
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In 1954, Congress enacted section 408, which ·explicitly empowered the FDA to establish tolerances for pesticide residues on
raw agricultural commodities. 93 With this amendment, section
406 lost its importance94 until the recognition of widespread environmental contamination of basic foods by compounds such as
PCBs, mercury, and various mycotoxins convinced the FDA that
it needed a statutory mechanism to control consumer exposure to
§ 402(a)(2)(A), read in conjunction with § 406, prohibits the addition to food of any poisonous substance-regardless of the quantity or the degree of risk the substance poses,
To establish that a food is adulterated under § 402(e)(2)(A), the FDA need only prove
that the substance is added and that it is capable of producing toxic effects. Section 406
authorizes the FDA to relax this unequivocal prohibition for a substance that cannot be
avoided by good manufacturing practice that is necessary to the production of a food.
Together, these lest two provisions appear to create a system requiring FDA "licensure"
or approval-in the form of a tolerance-for any added poison.
It is puzzling why Congress retained the first clause of§ 402(e)(l) when in §§ 402(e)
(2)(A) and 406 it created a more comprehensive system for regulating added food
constituents. The legislative history of the 1938 Act does not resolve the puzzle, although
it suggests a possible explanation for what, in retrospect, seems an oversight. Until final
House passage, § 402(a)(l) did not differentiate between added and naturally occurring
substances; it declared a food adulterated if it contained any poisonous or deleterious
substance that might render it "dangerous to health." One objective of the new legislation
was to enable the FDA to regulate foods whose natural constituents posed a risk to health,
Since earlier versions of the bill contained a provision similar to§ 402(e)(2), which dealt
explicitly with added substances, it would have been possible, perhaps natural, to reed
earljer versions of§ 402(a)(l) to apply only to naturally occurring poisons. However, when
the House added the second clause of § 402(a)(l)-esteblishing the "ordinarily injurious" standard for naturally occurring poisons-it thereby implied that the first clause
applied to added substances.
As a result of this legislative handiwork, the FDA may in theory proceed in either of
two ways against a food that contains an added poisonous substance-under the "may
render injurious" standard of § 402(a)(l) or under § 402(a)(2)(A), which prohibits any
added poison for which no tolerance has been set. The agency hes usually relied only on
§ 402(a)(l). At first blush, it is difficult to see why the FDA would ever invoke this section,
which appears to impose on it a heavier burden of proof. Perhaps the agency hes wanted
to avoid having to explain why, in the face of the word "shell" in § 406, it hes not
established a single tolerance for an unavoidable or necessary added poisonous substance,
In addition, agency enforcement personnel may have quickly concluded, since most seizures are uncontested, that making a case was as easy under §402(e)(l), and that relying
on this provision did not call into question its administrative authority. Until the late
1960s, the FDA relied almost exclusively on court enforcement end nev.er fully explored
the range of administrative powers open to it.
93. Pesticide Residues Amendment of 1954, supra note 9 (codified at 21 U.S.C, § 346a
(1976)).
94. Although the FDA never invoked its formal authority, § 406 theoretically remained an important part of the agency's statutory armament, for § 408 did not deal with
the problems of pesticide drift or persistence, which can contaminate foods on which no
pesticide is used or intended to remain. Furthermore, prior to 1958, when the Food Additives Amendment was passed, without § 406 the statute would have afforded the FDA no
basis, other than § 402(a)(l), to regulate the occurrence of pesticide residues in processed
food at levels above the tolerance established for the raw commodity.

December 1978]

Regulating Carcinogens

199

contaminated foods. 95 Since the early 1970s, section 406 has provided the legal framework for FDA regulation of environmental
contaminants and other "unavoidable" by-products of modern
food production, such as lead in the solder used to seal tin cans. 96
It therefore is pertinent to examine this provision's criteria.
Most notably, section 406, which is enforced through section
402(a)(2)(A), does not unequivocally preclude the marketing of
food that contains an added carcinogenic substance. Indeed, the
section does not mention or differentiate among specific risks to
health. The FDA has taken the position that it may establish a
tolerance for a contaminant shown to be carcinogenic-and thus
"approve" its presence in food in quantities below the tolerance-if the criteria of section 406 are met. 97 To be eligible for a
section 406 tolerance, a substance must be unavoidable despite
good manufacturing practice or "necessary in the production" of
a food. 98 In establishing a tolerance, the FDA must by statute
consider two criteria: (1) the level -at which consumption of the
food will not pose a risk to public health, taking into account
other ways in which consumers may be exposed to the substance,
and (2) the extent to which good manufacturing ~xa-ctice can
reduce the substance. 99 If careful processing or storage can
achieve lower levels of a contaminant than health considerations
might otherwise dictate, the agency presumably must establish
any tolerance at such lower levels. 100
Read literally, section 406 presents the FDA with an insoluble dilemma. The section specifies that the agency "shall" establish a tolerance for any added poisonous substance that cannot
be eliminated through good manufacturing practice. At the same
95. It should be noted that § 406 does not enable the FDA to control the occurrence
of contamination. To the extent that environmental contaminants of food are unavoidable, as is ~he case with mercury in swordfish, the establishment of a tolerance can have
no effect on the levels that occur in the environment. What a § 406 tolerance does, in
theory, is limit human exposure to the contaminant by eliminating foods containing
higher levels from the food supply.
96. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744 (1974).
97. Aflatoxins in Shelled Peanuts and Peanut Products Used as Human Foods: Proposed Tolerance, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,748 (1974). See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in
Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,745 (1974).
98. I have previously adverted to the potential flexibility of these requirements, and
to the FDA's solicitude for familiar constituents of the food supply. See text at notes 6769 supra.
99. 21 u.s.c. § 346 (1976).
100. Once the FDA has established a tolerance, a food containing the contaminant
in concentrations that exceed the tolerance is unlawful without further inquiry into the
health hazard it may pose. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(2)(A), 346 (1976).
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time it implies that no tolerance may exceed the highest level
that poses no risk to health. However, the lowest achievable levels
of some environmental contaminants undoubtedly exceed the
levels that can confidently be called safe. For a contaminant,
such as aflatoxin, that has been proved an unequivocal animal
and probable human carcinogen, most scientists would agree that
no level of exposure can be judged safe for all inq.ividuals. Yet
section 406 does not appear to contemplate that, in such a circumstance, forbidding marketing of the contaminated food is an
appropriate alternative.
The FDA has essentially ignored this textual dilemma. The
agency has never acknowledged that it must establish tolerances
for all "unavoidable" contaminants of food regardless of the risks
posed to consumer health. At the same time, it has declined to
adopt the "no threshold" rationale for regulating carcinogenic
contaminants of important food products, most notably peanuts
contaminated with aflatoxin. In effect, the agency has interpreted
section 406 as permitting consideration of the food's value, as well
as the contaminant's toxicity and the extent to which its occurrence can be controlled. Such consideration is seldom explicit
and often conducted under the guise of assessing the practicability of storage or processing procedures designed to reduce
the substance.
A third criterion, while not explicitly sanctioned by the Act,
is nonetheless considered by the FDA in establishing a section 406
tolerance: the capability of analytical methods to measure the
contaminant. 101 No agency can enforce a tolerance below the level
that practicable analyses can detect. The capability of chemical
analysis may be a primary determinant of a tolerance for a toxic
contaminant if, for example, the best method available is not
sufficiently sensitive to measure levels that theoretically are
avoidable. 102 If no method could measure the level considered
necessary to protect public health, the agency would face having
to establish a tolerance it could not enforce. One alternative-to
101. Cf. Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,816
(1977) (in establishing tolerances, the Commissioner will establish the method of detection
to be used). See also Letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to
J.B. Cordaro, Group Manager, Food Group, Office of Technology Assessment (Jan. 22,
1979) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
102. In 1974, when the FDA first confronted the need to determine the marketability
of PBB-contaminated foods produced in Michigan, it initially established its "action
level" (a form of "tentative" tolerance, see note 85 supra and accompanying text) at the
lowest level measurable by the best available analytical methods. Hearings on Polybrominated Biphenyls in Lansing, Michigan (May 29, 1975) (testimony of Dr. Albert Kolbye).
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conclude that no tolerance could be established-would be pointless, because the FDA could not prove a violation of section
402(a) (1) or (2) (A) if it could not detect the ostensibly "unlawful"
contaminant. In such a case, the FDA would set the tolerance at
the current limit of detection by the best practicable method of
analysis.
The Act's elaborate procedure for establishing tolerances
under section 406 partially accounts for the FDA's failure to make
use of this section for many years. 103 The agency must first publish a proposed tolerance and invite public comments. After evaluating the comments, the agency must publish a "final order"
after which objections and requests for a formal evidentiary hearing may be filed. Such a filing stays the FDA's tolerance pending
the hearing. 10~ Following the formal administrative proceedings,
including an administrative law judge's initial decision and any
appeal to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, the agency issues
an order establishing the tolerance, which is subject to review in
the courts of appeals. 105
Partly because of the expense and duration of that procedure, the FDA has devised an informal system for setting "action
levels" for environmental contaminants of food. An action level
specifies the quantity of an added poisonous substance that will
move the FDA to initiate court enforcement action against a food
under section 402(a)(l). 106 It represents a formalized exercise of
the agency's prosecutorial judgment, although it does not carry
the same authoritative weight in enforcement proceedings as a
formal 406 tolerance. 107 The FDA regulations state that the
103. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1976). See Hamilton, Rule Making on a Record by the Food
and Drug Administration, 5Q TExAs L. REv. 1132 (1972).
104. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(2) (1976). A tolerance that is stayed by objections and a
request for a hearing serves as an "action level" for FDA enforcement during the pendency
of the hearing. See note 85 supra and accompanying text; Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,818 (1977).
105. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(0 (1976).
106. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 109.4(b)
(1978); Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
39 Fed. Reg. 42,743 (1974).
107. For example, in the case of aflatoxin contamination of com, a United States
district court in Georgia refused to enjoin a distributor of grain from shipping corn containing a quantity of aflatoxin in excess of the FDA's informal action level of 20 parts per
billion (ppb). United States v. Boston Farm Center, No. 77-42 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 1977),
revd., 590 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1979). Instead of accepting the FDA's determination that
the presence of 20 ppb aflatoxin rendered the com injurious to health, the district court
examined the evidence and concluded that aflatoxin-contaminated com was not injurious
to health unless the quantity of aflatoxin present exceed 100 ppb. The district court's
ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which concluded that
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agency will establish an action level for a contaminant, rather
than initiate proceedings to establish a formal tolerance, when
data on safe levels of exposure are incomplete or when the levels
at which the contaminant occurs appear to be in flux. 108 The same
criteria ostensibly govern the setting of action levels as apply to
the establishing of formal 406 tolerances.
As noted previously, for many years the FDA regulated pesticide residues on raw agricultural commodities through a system
of informal administrative tolerances which served the same
function as the current action levels. However, because of the
current interest in environmental contaminants and the controversiality of judgments about the safety of levels of exposure and
about the ability of food manufacturers to reduce them, 109 the
FDA now provides an opportunity, albeit a limited one, for public
participation in the setting of action levels. When the agency
identifies a contaminant that should be controlled, e.g., mercury
in fish, it announces in the Federal Register the action level at
which it will initiate court enforcement. Simultaneously, the
agency makes available for public examination whatever toxicity
and human exposure data underlie its initial determination. Interested persons may submit comments on the exposure level
approved, and the agency may respond to the comments if persuaded that the level initially announced should be revised. 110
This procedure represents a modest advance beyond the agency's
older practice, in which action levels were not publicly announced, but it falls short of permitting effective debate over the
agency's judgment about safety, avoidability, and the value of
the food.
"the facts in this case are so one-sided that any finding of non-adulteration for amounts
of aflatoxin between 20 ppb and 100 ppb would be clearly erroneous." 590 F.2d at 151.
The court of appeals did not, however, rule that it was in principle inappropriate for the
lower court to reexamine the FDA's action level.
108. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,817
(1977); Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,745 (1974).
109. See, e.g., Letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drug Administration, to Congressman William M. Brodhead (Aug. 12, 1977) (denying petition to lower
action levels for polybrominated biphenyls) (copy on file with the Michigan l,aw Review).
110. Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 109.4(b) (1978).
This procedure represents a retreat from the agency's original proposal, which would have
provided notice-and-comment rulemaking for the establishment of action levels, with one
important difference: any "proposed" action level would be enforced in the interim. See
Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 39 Fed.
Reg. 42,743, 42,746 (1974). Under the procedure finally adopted, the FDA's action levels
will not be the product of a public proceeding, and may therefore carry less weight in court
enforcement actions. See note 107 supra.
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C. Intentional Ingredients of Processed Foods
For purposes of legal analysis, this third category of food
constituents must be divided into four subcategories which, although they present similar problems of safety evaluation and
regulatory control, are subject to different statutory treatment.
These four subcategories are artificial statutory creations; they do
not correspond to functional categories in the production of food.
Furthermore, the classifications themselves reflect historical distinctions that bear no relation to either functional or safety criteria. The Act's definition of "food additive," considered below,
is illlustrative. The four subcategories are: (1) "food additives"
used as ingredients in foods, (2) ingredients that are "generally
recognized as safe," (3) "prior sanctioned substances" used as
ingredients in food, and (4) "color additives."
Popular misconception assumes that "food additives" are
artificial substances used in food production while natural ingredients, such as salt or potatoes, are simply that-ingredients. In
fact, not every artificial substance used to make food is a food
additive. Moreover, the Act does not distinguish between ingredients produced by chemical synthesis and those produced naturally by agriculture. The definition of food additive, which appears in section 201(s) of the Act, m embraces both artificial and
natural substances while simultaneously excluding several important classes of ingredients:
The term "food additive" means any substance the intended use
of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly
or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting
the characteristics of any food (including any substance intended
for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding food; and including any source of radiation intended for any such use), if such
substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having
been adequately shown through scientific procedures (or, in the
case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through
either scientific procedures or experience based on common use in
food) to be safe under the conditions of its intended use; except
that such term does not include(3) a color additive; or
(4) any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval

granted prior to the enactment of this paragraph . . . pursuant to
111. 21 U.S.C. § 32l(s) (1976).
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. or the Meat

The subcategory of food additives thus does not include substances whose use in food is "generally recognized as safe" by
qualified experts, a category commonly referred to by the acronym GRAS. In addition, the definition excludes most ingredients
that either the FDA, or, in the case of meat and poultry, the
Department of Agriculture, had sanctioned for use in food prior
to September 6, 1958. It also excludes color additives. Each of
these exceptions is examined after a discussion of the requirements applicable to food additives.
1. Direct food additives

Any ingredient that is a food additive, i.e., that is not generally recognized as safe, must be the subject of an approved food
additive regulation before it may lawfully be used in food, 113 and
the FDA may not approve a food additive unless it meets certain
basic criteria. Most important, the proponent of an additive must
show that it will be safe under the conditions of its intended use.
This requires a demonstration that, with reasonable certainty,
the additive will not adversely affect the health of consumers. 114
The Delaney Clause reinforces this requirement by flatly prohibiting the approval of a food additive that has been shown to
induce cancer in man or, by ingestion or other appropriate tests,
in animals.U5
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Section 402(a)(2)(C) declares a food adulterated "if it is, or it beers or contains,
any food additive which is unsafe within the meaning of section 409." 21 U.S.C. § 32l(e)
(2)(C) (1976). Section 409(a), 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1976), provides in relevant pert:
A food additive shall, with respect to any particular use or intended use of such
additives, be deemed to be unsafe for the purposes of the application of clause
(2)(C) of section 402(a), unless(2) there is in effect, and it and its use or intended use are in conform•
ity with, a regulation issued under this section prescribing the conditions
under which such additive may be safely used.
While such a regulation relating to a food additive is in effect, a food
shall not, by reason of bearing or containing such as additive in accordance
with the regulation, be considered adulterated within the meaning of clause
(1) of section 402(a).
114. See 21 U.S.C. f 348(c)(3)(A) (1976): See generally Freedman, Reasonable Certainty of No Harm: Reviving the Safety Standard for Food Additives, Color Additive.9,
and Animal Drugs, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 245 (1978).
115. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976). Neither the Delaney Clause nor any other
provision of § 409 specifically mandates that the FDA shall withdraw approval of an
approved additive subsequently found to induce cancer or to be otherwise unsafe, but this
requirement seems an unmistakable inference from the provisions governing initial ap-
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A food additive must also be shown to be functional, i.e.,
capable of accomplishing its intended technical effect. 116 For example, a preservative must preserve when used in the quantities
intended. If this elementary criterion is satisfied, however, the
FDA may not demand any showing of the additive's broader utility or consider the availability of alternatives that would accomplish the same technical effect. 117 The Food Additives Amendment acknowledges the "benefits" many additives can provide,
and reflects Congress's judgment that the market-not the government-should determine the extent to which "safe" food addi-=tives are used. 118
The FDA may condition its approval to assure that use of an
additive will be safe. 119 Such conditions typically include limitations on the levels of use and can include limitations on the foods
in which or the purposes for which the additive may be used.
Occasionally, the FDA may restrict the form in which an additive
may be marketed, e.g., solely as a tabletop sweetener. 120 And the
proval of food additives. The FDA has historically assumed that a clear finding of carcinogenicity ordinarily requires prompt action to terminate approval of an additive. But see
note 56 supra and Culliton & Waterfall, supra note 56.
116. This standard is implicit in the requirement of§ 409(b)(2)(C) that a food additive petition contain "all relevant data bearing on the physical or other technical effect
such additive is intended to produce." 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(2)(C) (1976).
117. See Saccharin And Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995, 20,002 (1977); Freedman,
supra note 114, at 251.
118. Both the House and Senate reports stated:
The question of whether an additive produces such effect (or how much of an
additive is required for such effect) is a factual one, and does not involve any
judgment on the part of the Secretary of whether such effect results in any added
"value" to the consumer of such food or enhances the marketability from a merchandising point of view.
H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958); S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1958).
119. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(l)(A) (1976) specifies:
(1) The Secretary shall(A) by order establish a regulation (whether or not in accord with that
proposed by the petitioner) prescribing, with respect to one or more proposed
uses of the food additive involved, the conditions under which such additive
may be safely used (including, but not limited to, specifications as to the
particular food or classes of food in or on which such additive may be used,
the maximum quantity which may be used or permitted to remain in or on
such food, the manner in which such additive may be added to or used in or
on such food, and any directions or other labeling or packaging requirements
for such additive deemed necessary by him to assure the safety of such use),
and shall notify the petitioner of such order and the reasons for such action;
or
(B) by order deny the petition, and shall notify the petitioner of such order
and of the reasons for such action.
120. Authon'ty to do so is less obvious than the authority to specify the foods to which
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act explicitly permits the agency to prescribe labeling for the
additive, apparently to provide information to commercial
users. 121 The FDA has on occasion, thus far without formal legal
challenge, used this authority to prescribe labeling requirements
for the finished foods in which an additive is used. 122
Because section 409 requires the FDA to verify the safety of
a food additive before it may lawfully be used, a petitioner seeking approval, usually the manufacturer or a potential user, must
submit to the agency data sufficient to support a finding of
safety. 123 The FDA has developed informal standards for the toxicological tests a petitioner must submit to establish a food additive's safety .124 The type and extent of testing required are likely
to vary with the quantities in which, and the purposes for which,
the additive is. to be used. Although it has not always done so, the
FDA reportedly now requires that any direct additive to be used
at significant levels in food be tested in long-term animal feeding
studies to determine whether it may induce cancer or other
chronic effects. The agency also now requires testing for teratogenic effects (birth defects) and routinely suggests, though it does
not require, mutagenesis testing. 125
While occasionally a petitioner may feed an additive to
an additive may be added from the language of § 409(c)(l)(A), but has been exercised
occasionally. See, e.g., Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995 (1977); Aspartame,
39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 (1974). The FD A's approval of aspartame, another artificial sweetner,
has since been stayed. 40 Fed. 56,907 (1975)).
121. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(l)(A) (1976).
122. E.g., BHA, 21 C.F.R. § 172.ll0(c) (1978); sodium nitrite, 21 C.F.R. § 172.175(b)
(1978); potassium iodide, 21 C.F.R. § 172.375(b) (1978); aspartame, 39 Fed. Reg. 27,317
(1974).
123. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(b) (1976).
124. A petitioner can ascertain these standards by asking the agency's Division of
Food and Color Additives, but they are not set forth in detail in the Code of Federal
Regulations or any other publication. 21 C.F.R. § 170.20(a) (1978) merely states:
In reaching a decision on any petition filed under section 409 of the act, the
Commissioner will give full consideration to the . . . adequacy of the methods
employed to demonstrate safety for the proposed use, and the Commissioner will
he guided by the principles and procedures for establishing the safety of food additives stated in current publications of the National Academy of Sciences-National
Research Council . . . .
The regulations governing the form and content of food additive petitions are brief and
general. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 170.20, .22, 171.1, .6, .7 (1978).
125. Letter to the author from Joseph V. Rodricks, Ph.D., Assistant to the Director
for Science Policy, Bureau of Foods, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (September 28,
1978) [hereinafter cited as Rodricks Jetted. Some uncertainty remains about the extent
to which the FDA routinely requires long-term testing for direct food additives, and there
apparently have been exceptions to the generalization set forth in the text. A deficiency
in the agency's administration of § 409 has been its failure to spell out, in regulations or
some other formal policy statement, precisely what tests it regularly requires.
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human volunteers 126-usually to demonstrate palatability or
functionality-the data for evaluating safety are derived almost
exclusively from animal experiments. The critical tests are those
designed to yield probabilistic answers to broad questions, such
as whether an additive causes cancer. If a food additive induces
cancer in animal tests, its use may not be approved at any level.
If an additive's effects do not include cancer, the agency applies
a "safety factor" to determine permissible human exposure. Except in special cases, 127 the agency adheres to a safety factor of
100, dividing the dose at which no adverse effects are observed in
animals by 100 to derive a dose that will, with reasonable certainty, be safe in humans. When the agency relies exclusively on
short-term, or acute, studies, as it frequently does in evaluating
indirect additives to which exposure is lower, it will apply a
higher safety factor, usually 1000. 128
The FDA would be the first to acknowledge that this process
does not guarantee that an additive may not prove harmful to
some individuals. Debate continues over whether experimental
animals are suitable models for evaluating the likely effects of a
substance in humans. In the final analysis, a 100-fold safety factor is arbitrary, justified as much by ease of use as by any theory
of comparative biology. 129 And the relatively small number of
animals typically used in feeding studies weakens the statistical
reliability of a finding that a ·particular dose produces no adverse
effects.1 30 The FDA's determination that an additive is "safe;"
therefore, suffers from several uncertainties. But the licensure
process for food additives provides greater assurance of the reliability of such determinations than can be ascribed to judgments
about the safety of other food constituents, such as environmental
contaminants, which may have undergone very little testing and
126. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(i) (1976).
127. In 1976, the General Accounting Office sharply criticized the FDA for allowing
saccharin to be used at levels corresponding to 1/30 of the "no observed effect" dose in
animals. The agency acknowledged that this allowance departed from its standard practice. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, NEED To R.EsoLVE
SAFETY QUESTIONS ON SACCHARIN 27 (Aug. 16, 1976).
128. 21 C.F.R. § 170.22 (1978); Rodricks letter, supra note 125.
129. Conversation with Joseph V. Rodricks, Ph.D., Assistant to the Director for Science Policy, Bureau of Foods, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (March 1977).
130. Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995, 19,998 (1977); see Page, Chronic
Toxicity and Carcinogenicity Guidelines, 1 J. ENVTL. PATHOLOGY & ToxtCOLOGY 161, 17778 (1977); Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and
Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 EcoLOGY L.Q. 497, 512-13 (1978) (and sources cited
therein).
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which the FDA must take the initiative to control. 131
The statutorily prescribed process for approving or withdrawing approval of a food additive is as complex as that required
for the establishment of tolerances under section 406, 132 although
the procedures are not identical. The FDA must announce in the
Federal Register the filing of any petition for a food additive
regulation-the equivalent of the petitioner's "proposal"-and
later publish a final order of approval or disapproval. 133 If a petition is accepted for filing, the agency usually will approve the
additive. 134 Any person adversely affected by the agency's action
may file objections and request a formal evidentiary hearing. 135
Under section 409, however, the FDA need not stay its order
pending that hearing; thus, the agency's approval of an additive
may become effective even though it has granted a hearing on its
underlying finding of safety .136 The Commissioner's final decision
following a hearing is subject to review in a court of appeals. 137
Essentially the same procedure must be followed when the FDA
131. The principal difficulty in determining the risk posed by an environmental
contaminant of food, or any other constituent for which advance FDA approval need not
he obtained, is the shortage of reliable safety data. No "petitioner" need seek permission
to market swordfish containing mercury, and thus the burden of assembling data and, in
some cases, conducting necessary additional tests falls on the government, often on the
FDA or state agencies. Letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drugs,
to J.B. Cordaro, Group Manager, Feed Group, Office of Technology Assessment (Jan, 22,
1979) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); Conversation with Robert S. Jackson,
M.D., Assistant State Health Commissioner and Director, Office of Health Protection and
Environmental Management, Virginia Department of Health (Oct. 22, 1978); Rodricks
letter, supra note 125.
132. See text at notes 103-06 supra; letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of
Food and Drugs, to J.B. Cordaro, Office of Technology Assessment (Jan. 22, 1979) (copy
on file with the Michigan Law Review).
133. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(b)(5), (c)(l)-(2) (1976); 21 C.F.R. §§ 171.l(i)(2), .100 (1978).
134. Conversation with Joseph V. Rodricks, Ph.D., Assistant to the Director for Science Policy, Bureau of Foods, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (March 1977).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 348(0 (1976); 21 C.F.R. § 171.110 (1978). The FDA has construed
"person adversely affected" to embrace opponents of the approval of an additive which
the Commissoner has concluded is safe, as well as manufacturers or users of additives
whose petitions are turned down. See Aspartame, 39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 (1974); 40 Fed. Reg,
56,907 (1975) (staying effectiveness of aspartame regulation). Food Chemical News reports
that "FDA-ers now believe the Board of Inquiry on Aspartame probably will not begin
until spring and may be delayed until summer." All UAREP Document.~ on A.~partame
To Be Submitted to FDA, Fooo CHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 6, 1978, at 36.
136. 21 U.S.C. § 348(e) (1976). More than a year elapsed between the FDA's initial
approval of aspartame, 39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 (1974), and its decision to stay the effect of
the food additive regulation. 40 Fed. Reg. 56,907 (1975). During that time, the successful
petitioner was technically free to market the additive even though the agency had agreed
to grant a formal hearing on its decision. For practical and public relations reasons, the
firm chose not to do so.
137. 21 u.s.c. § 348(g) (1976).
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seeks to end use of an approved food additive, even if the agency
invokes the Delaney Clause. 138 The Act_ provides no means for
abbreviating this process if a petitioner or other objectors insist
on their full procedural rights. However, the statute's elaborate
procedure is rarely followed in full. Most food additive petitions
are eventually approved, and in twenty years only two have provoked demands for a formal hearing. 139
2. Ingredients generally recognized as safe (GRAS)
As noted above, the statutory definition of "food additive"
excludes any ingredient that is
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately
shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance
used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific
procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe
under the conditions of its intended use. . . .140

Congress limited the coverage of the Food Additives Amendment
138. When the FDA issues a regulation on its own initiative, e.g., when the agency
seeks to withdraw approval or ban an additive, the Act requires that at least 30 days expire
between initial publication and issuance of a final order. 21 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1976). No
such requirement applies to a regulation issued in response to a food additive petition.
See Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995, 20,005 (1977).
139. Both are petitions for the approval of the artificial sweeteners cyclamate and
aspartame. Cyclamate was banned as an ingredient in food in 1969, following the FDA's
receipt of evidence suggesting that it might be an animal carcinogen. The sweetener had
not previously been regulated as a food additive, but rather was being used-with the
FDA's concurrence-on the premise that it was GRAS. The new evidence destroyed its
reputation as safe, thus requiring the manufacturer to obtain approval of a food additive
petition before the sweetener could lawfully be used again. In 1973, such a petition was
submitted, and in 1976, FDA Commissioner Alexander M. Schmidt declined to approve
it on the ground that doubts about the sweetener's carcinogenicity had not been resolved.
41 Fed. Reg. 43,754 (1976). The manufacturer, Abbott Laboratories, demanded and received a formal evidentiary hearing. Its interest in pursuing the matter through the full
administrative process was probably stimulated by the FDA's announcement in April 1977
that it intended to ban the use of saccharin, the only artificial sweetener currently approved for use in this county.
The second § 409 proceeding that has resulted in a request for a hearing involves
aspartame, a new sweetener that appeared to be an alternative to both cyclamate and
saccharin. The FDA approved the food additive petition for aspartame in 1974. 39 Fed.
Reg. 27,317 (1974). Its approval provoked formal objections and a request for a hearing
from an attorney associated with the consumer movement and a member of a distinguished medical faculty, both of whom contended that the agency had misinterpreted
data showing that the ingredient could cause brain damage in infants and children. The
FDA agreed that a hearing was justified, and subsequently persuaded the affected parties
to submit the dispute to a Public Board oflnquiry, a tribunal provided by agency regulations and resembling some conceptions of a "science court." 21 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-.45 (1978).
The hearing on aspartame is expected to occur sometime in 1979.
140. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976).
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in this fashion principally to forestall ostensibly needless testing
of ingredients, such as salt, sugar, and other familiar substances,
which had long been used in foods without evident harmful effect.141 The GRAS exception thus represents a rough congressional judgment about the priority for the FDA's evaluation of the
safety of food ingredients. 142
Numerous cases have construed the basic criteria for finding
that an ingredient is GRAS. 143 As the statute itself indicates,
there are two classes of such ingredients: (a) those currently recognized by experts as safe on the basis of their common use in
food prior to 1958 (usage alone after 1958 cannot support general
recognition of safety), 144 and (b) those generally recognized by
experts as safe on the basis of toxicological tests,. whether such
tests were conducted before or after 1958. 145 Experts need not be
unanimous in their recognition of an ingredient's safety, but there
must be a substantial consensus. 146 The FDA will reject a claim
141. See Food Additiues: Hearings on Bills To Amend the Federal Food, Drug, and
Co.~metic Act with Respect to Chemical Additives in Food Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Science of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong,,
1st & 2d Sess. 442, 460-65 (1957-1958)(statement of George P. Larrick, Commissioner of
Food and Drugs).
142. As the cyclamate experience demonstrates, GRAS status affords an ingredient
no protection comparable to that provided by a "grandfather clause," which usually
permanently exempts existing activities or marketed products from new statutory requirements. See Cyclamic Acid and Its Salts, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,063 (1969).
143. Most of these decisions, it should be noted, have involved drugs intended for use
in humans or in animals. The Act requires premarket proof of safety and effectiveness for
any "new" human or animal drug, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360b (1976), and defines a "new
drug" as one whose safety or effectiveness is not "generally recognized [by qualified
experts!.'' 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(l), (w) (1976). Accordingly, many of the decisions interpreting the criteria for premarket approval of drugs are relevant to interpreting the criteria
for GRAS status. Moreover, several of the pertinent drug decisions involve drugs intended
for use in food-producing animals, which may become components of human food. See,
e.g., United States v. Articles of Food & Drug, Coli-Trol 80 Medicated, 372 F. Supp. 915
(N.D. Ga. 1974), affd., 518 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 1,048,000 Capsules
More or Less, 347 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd., 494 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1974),
144. See United States v. Naremco, Inc., 553 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1977).
145. For an ingredient to be eligible for GRAS status under this leg of the exception,
the FDA requires essentially the same quantity and quality of scientific evidence as would
h,e needed to support the approval of a food additive. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(b) (1978).
146. United States v. Articles of Drug Labeled "Quick-o-ver," 274 F. Supp. 443 (D,
Md. 1967). The FDA's regulations state,
(a) General recognition of safety may be based only on the views of experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety of substances directly or indirectly added to food. The basis of such views may be either (1) scientific procedures or (2) in the case of a substance used in food prior to January 1,
1958, through experience based on common use in food. General recognition of
safety requires common knowledge about the substance throughout the scientific
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to GRAS status that relies on toxicological tests ("scientific procedures") that have not been published in the scientific literature, where they can be evaluated by the scientific community .147
The Act does not explicitly allow any consideration of utility
or benefit in determining whether an ingredient is GRAS. Thus,
the fact that salt has important preservative qualities should not
in theory affect the determination. However, an ingredient's utility is likely to influence even scientists' judgments about its
safety if it has been used for centuries prior to 1958. In this
connection, it should be emphasized that the conclusion that an
ingredient is not "generally recognized as safe" does not automatically preclude its use. If a petitioner can demonstrate that the
ingredient presents no risk to consumers, it may be approved as
a food additive under section 409(c).148
For many ingredients, general recognition of safety is conditioned upon the user's observance of specified restrictions, including limits on levels, source, purpose, and even on the foods to
which the ingredient may be added. 149 The FDA's published list
of selected GRAS ingredients specifies limitations that in many
instances are -comparable to those imposed on the use of approved
food additives. 150 However, the FDA has only occasionally attempted to prescribe special labeling requirements for such an
ingredient or for the foods in which it is used. 151
Because GRAS ingredients do not fall within the definition
of "food additive," they are not technically subject to the Delaney
community knowledgeable about the safety of substances directly or indirectly
added to food.
21 C.F.R. § 170.30(a) (1978).
147. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30 (b) (1978):
General recognition of safety based upon procedures shall require the same
quantity and quality of scientific evidence as is required to obtain approval of a food
additive regulation for the ingredient. General recognition of safety through scientific procedures shall ordinarily be based upon published studies and other data and
information.
148. A conclusion that an ingredient is not GRAS may, however, interrupt its use,
for a food additive may not lawfully be used until the FDA has issued a regulation
approving its use-a process that can require several months or longer. The FDA has
devised a system of "interim food additive regulations" to bridge this gap where it concludes that a sudden suspension of use would have unacceptable consequences. See note
155 infra and accompanying text.
149. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(h) (1978).
150. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 182.1180 (caffeine), .1440 (magnesium stearate), .1295
(ethyl formate) (1978).
151. See Substances Added Directly to Human Food Affirmed as Generally
Recognized as Safe (GRAS), 21 C.F.R. § 184.l(f) (1978); see, e.g., Sorbitol, 21 C.F.R.
§ 184.1835(e) (1978).
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Clause. In practice, however, the Delaney principle prevents the
introduction or continued use of an ostensibly GRAS ingredient
that is found in appropriate tests to induce cancer in experimental animals. 152 Such a finding would undermine any basis for general expert recognition of the ingredient's safety, and thereby
render it a food additive requiring affirmative FDA approval-approval that the Delaney Clause would formally preclude. This analysis explains the FDA's actions in the case of
cyclamate, which before 1970 had been widely used in the belief
that it was GRAS. 153 A report by the principal manufacturer of
cyclamate that it might be an animal carcinogen destroyed that
status, making its continued use unlawful overnight. 154
The cyclamate episode illustrates an important distinction
between ingredients that are excepted from the food additive
definition because they are GRAS and ingredients that are ex152. Any intentional food ingredient found to cause cancer in human.~ would be
banned by the FDA as a matter of course, whether it was GRAS, prior sanctioned, or a
food additive. The circumstance more likely to confront the FDA with increasing frequency, however, is the discovery that a food ingredient is an animal carcinogen, as in
the case of saccharin.
153. 30 Fed. Reg. 15,856 (1965); Cyclamic Acid and Its Salts, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,063
(1969).
154. Cyclamic Acid and Its Salts, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,063 (1969). See S. Plotkin, The
Cyclamate Ban: Science, Politics, and Law 9-11 (April 1978) (unpublished thesis).
The conclusion suggested by the text is not dictated by the language of the statute,
which does not specify whether the FDA can weigh the benefits of an ingredient in determining whether it is GRAS. It could be argued that by creating the GRAS exception,
Congress recognized the utility of commonly used food ingredients, and that the agency
should consider such utility whenever new information about the risks posed by a familiar
ingredient comes to light. A candidate for such an analysis might be sodium nitrite, which
is widely used in preparing cured meat products and whose benefits include preservation
against botulism. Surely in such a case, one might argue, the FDA should be able to
consider such benefits, i.e., seek to avoid the ostensibly greater risk of botulism, in deciding whether to subject the ingredient to the rigorous standards of§ 409(c).
No one has ever formally espoused this approach to the FDA, but it is hinted at in
one FDA proposal, though not in a context that involved a potential carcinogen. See
General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food Ingredients, 39 Fed. Reg.
34,194, 34,195 (1974). Its formal adoption at this late date would be very difficult to
explain, and would effectively transform the GRAS exception into a genuine grandfather
clause, subject to forfeiture upon the agency's finding that the benefits of an ingredient
did not justify an exception to the requirements of § 409(c). Moreover, in determining
whether the Delaney Clause should apply, no valid scientific basis exists for distinguishing
between food additives, which require formal FDA approval, and GRAS ingredients. As a
group, GRAS ingredients are less likely to be carcinogenic, simply because of their record
of safe usage. The lack of evidence of adverse effects may also be a sufficient reason for
assigning them a low priority for safety evaluation. But the health risks posed by a food
constituent that is shown to induce cancer in experimental animals does not depend on
the regulatory category into which it falls. See Hutt, Public Policy Issue.~ in Regulating
Carcinogen.~ in Food, 33 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 541, 548-50 (1978).
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empt because the FDA or USDA had sanctioned their use prior
to 1958: An ingredient's general recognition as safe is always vulnerable to new evidence casting doubt on its safety. An ingredient
that ceases to be GRAS automatically becomes a "food additive,"
and must be approved by the FDA for its use to be lawful. 155
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not mention procedures for determining whether an ingredient is GRAS: the statutory definition of food additive is in a legal sense self-executing.
Shortly after the passage of the Food Additives Amendment, the
FDA issued, and from time to time has amended, a nonexclusive
list of ingredients that the agency was prepared to acknowledge
were GRAS-and which, therefore, could lawfully be used without affirmative approval. 158 In addition, the agency has consistently acknowledged that a food manufacturer may determine for
itself whether an ingredient it is considering using is GRAS. 157
Should a manufacturer independently conclude that an ingredient is, he runs the risk that the FDA will disagree and initiate
regulatory a~tion against the product, but in such an action the
agency would have to prove in court that the ingredient was not
GRAS. 158 Neither the ingredient's absence from the FDA's list nor
the manufacturer's failure to consult the agency in advance
would be relevant.
Under this loose system, numerous food ingredients have
come into common use through the assumption by manufacturers-sometimes, but by no means always, endorsed by the
FDA-that they are GRAS. The FDA does not have a complete
inventory of such ingredients, and it lacks reliable information
155. The Act makes no provison for the transition between the loss of GRAS status
and the approval as a food additive. To bridge this gap, the FDA has established procedures for the issuance of interim food additive regulations. 21 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-.37 (1978).
An interim food additive regulation may be issued for an ingredient whose safety is
questioned by new evidence but whose continued use, pending the conduct of the studies
necessary to resolve the issue of safety, is found to pose no significant risk to human
health. Since controversy about its carcinogenicity arose in the early 1970s, saccharin has
been protected by an interim food additive regulation, as have mannitol and brominated
vegetable oil (BVO). 21 C.F.R. §§ 180.25, .30, .37 (1978). See Freedman, supra note 114,
at 259-64. The interim regulation for BVO was attacked as beyond the agency's authority;
and upheld, in Jacobson v. Edwards, (1971) Fooo DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 56,059.10
(D.D.C. 1971), af/d., (D.C. Cir. 1971).
156. Now codified at 21 C.F.R. § 182 (1978). The original list was initially proposed
at 23 Fed. Reg. 9511, 9516 (1958).
157. See General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food Ingredients, 41
Fed. Reg. 53,600, 53,603-04 (1976).
158. See United States v. Naremco, Inc., 553 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1977); United States
v. 41 Cases, More or Less (Naremco, Inc.), 420 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1970).
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about the extent and levels of their use. 159 To enhance its control
over the use of GRAS ingredients and better assure their safety,
the FDA has established a program for reviewing the available
scientific data on all listed GRAS ingredients and has created a
formal procedure for "affirming" the GRAS status of individual
substances. 160
3. Ingredients previously sanctioned by USDA or FDA
The Act's definition of food additive also expressly excludes
any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval
granted prior to [the enactment of the Food Additives Amendment] pursuant to this chapter, the Poultry Products Inspection
Act 161 • • • or the Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907 182 • • • • 183

This is a genuine "grandfather clause" for food ingredients that
the FDA or the USDA had affirmatively approved before the
159. The Acting FDA Commissioner observed in 1977 that about 2,100 direct food
additives have been approved and went on to describe the remainder of the universe of
food ingredients and other constituents:
There are over 400 nonflavor GRAS substances; approximately 1,650 flavors
and spices, some of which are GRAS and some regulated additives; about 400
regulated direct food additives and on the order of 10,000 GRAS and regulated
indirect additives. Additionally, there are some 65 regulated and 52 "provisionally
listed" color additives . . . .
Food Additiues: Competitiue, Regulatory, and Safety Problems: Hearings Befure the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 95th Cong, 1st Sess., Part 1, 44, 52 (1977)(statement of Sherwin Gardner) [hereinafter cited as Food Additiues Hearings]. See 21 C.F.R.
§§ 181, 182 (1978). The agency derives its estimates of overall exposure from a variety of
sources, including USDA records of food sales and surveys conducted by the National
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.
160. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 170.30(e).35, 184 (1978). The objective of this program is
eventually to produce a single, comprehensive list of ingredients which, based on current
toxicological criteria, have been affirmed to be generally recognized as safe, and whose
continued use can be subjected to the conditions specified in the agency's affirming
regulation. It should be noted, however, that the agency's review embraces only those
substances that appear on the published GRAS list, and that the agency has been unable
to devise a procedure to force users of unlisted ingredients to seek review and confirmation
of their safety. See generally Food Additiues Hearings, supra note 159 (statement of
Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs); Conversation with Peter
Barton Hutt, Former Chief Counsel, United States Food and Drug Administration (Oct.
19, 1978).
161. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, § 2, 71 Stat. 441 (1957)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-469 (1976)). The date of passage of this Act, August 28, 1957,
fell so near the September 6, 1957 enactment of the Food Additive Amendment that very
few substances qualify for exemption under its provisions. See Nitrates and Nitrites in
Poultry Products, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,275, 44,376 (1977).
162. Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 7, 16, 21, 43 U.S.C.).
163. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(4) (1976).

December 1978]

Regulating Carcinogens

215

enactment of section 409 on September 6, 1958. 164 Although the
FDA lacked formal authority to license food ingredients for general use prior to 1958, both it and the USDA routinely answered
requests for an opinion about the safety of individual ingredients.
In addition, the FDA exercised premarket control over, and thus
approved, the numerous ingredients permitted to be used in foods
covered by standards of identity .165 The USDA had issued formal
regulations describing permitted uses of many ingredients in
meat and poultry products, 166 and in some instances the FDA
formally acknowledged that the USDA had sanctioned certain
substances for food use. 167 Though a continuing source of controversy, the kind of documentation needed to establish a "prior
sanction" is principally a matter of interest for archivists, who
can debate the significance of correspondence written or articles
published by agency scientists in the early days of food regulation.168 It need only be noted that the Food Additives Amendment
excludes this class of previously sanctioned food ingredients, a
class which is of uncertain size, and which enjoys a special regulatory status. 169
164. It is, however, a limited exception. So called "prior sanctioned" ingredients are
excepted from the requirements for approval as food additives, but they are not exempt
from the other food safety provisions of the Act, including § 402(a)(l). See 21 C.F.if.'
§ 181 (1978).
165. For a discussion of FDA food standards of identity, see generally Merrill &
Collier, "l,ike Mother Used to Make": An Analysis of FDA Food Standards of Identity,
74 CoLUM. L. REv. 561 (1974). In the mid-1950s, approximately 50% of the foods purchased
by American consumers were covered by standards of identity, which were designed primarily to preserve the economic quality but were also used by the FDA to restrict the use
of potentially toxic ingredients. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ewing, 201 F.2d 347 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 923 (1953).
166. See, e.g., 9 C.F.R. §§ 319.300, 381.169 (1978).
167. See, e.g., Use of Sodium Nitrite, Sodium Nitrate, Potassium Nitrite and Potassium Nitrate, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,456 (1972).
168. See Gardner, Sowbelly Blues: The Links Between Bacon and Cancer, ESQUIRE,
November 1976, at 112; Letter from Carol Foreman, Assistant Secretary for Food and
Consumer Services, USDA, to Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drugs (April
22, 1977) (copy on file with the Michigan [,aw Review); Letter from Donald Kennedy to
Carol Foreman (July 12, 1977) (copy on file with the Michigan /,aw Review). As interpreted by the FDA, the "prior sanction" exception requires some evidence of official
acquiescence, but such evidence can be very informal. No USDA regulations or FDA
opinions used the magic language "sanctioned." Prior sanctions have been based on
actions ranging from a scientist's publication of an article acknowledging the safety of an
ingredient, to a USDA inspector's stamp of approval on processed meat, to the USDA's
approval of labels bearing a statement of ingredients.
169. Because of the diverse evidence of approval accepted by the FDA, estimates of
the number of ingredients that were sanctioned for one or more uses prior to 1958 are mere
speculation, but persons familiar with the matter doubt the number exceeds 200. See 23
Fed. Reg. 9511, 9516 (1958); 24 Fed. Reg. 9368, 9369 (1959).
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An ingredient's prior sanction status does not depend upon
a contemporary evaluation of its utility or safety, but rests solely
on the fact of prior approval by one of the two agencies. The FDA
has historically assumed that a prior sanctioned ingredient is
permanently grandfathered, i.e., that it may never become a food
additive so long as it is used for its sanctioned purpose, even if
new evidence casts doubt on its safety . 170 Since the Delaney
Clause only applies to food additives, an ingredient that has a
prior sanction is therefore not automatically barred from use in
food even if it is found to be an animal carcinogen. 171
This does not mean that the FDA cannot restrict the use of
a prior sanctioned ingredient that new evidence demonstrates is
unsafe. Foods containing such an ingredient are still subject to
the Act's basic adulteration provi1;1ons. 172 But the agency must be
able to show that the presence of the ingredient "may render"
food injurious to health under section 402(a)(l). A finding that a
prior sanctioned ingredient is a carcinogen would thus permit,
but would not automatically require, the FDA to terminate its
use. 173 Furthermore, the FDA has tentatively suggested that, in
170. See Hutt, A Regulator's Viewpoint in How SAFE Is SAFE? 116, 124 (1979).
171. In no clear instance has the FDA continued to approve the use of a prior sanctioned ingredient which has been found to induce cancer in experimental animals. The
case most nearly on point is that of sodium nitrite, an ingredient used in the curing of
many beef and pork products, notably including bacon. Faced with a recent finding that
sodium nitrite causes cancer in laboratory rats, the FDA and Department of Agriculture
are proposing to terminate all its uses but allow a phase-out period. Smith, supra note
56. When the Department of Justice advised that the present law did not allow the FDA
to delay banning an additive found to cause cancer, the two agencies recommended to
Congress that legislation be enacted to permit a phased withdrawal of nitrite from food.
See Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
(March 30, 1979).
172. See 21 C.F.R. § 181.l(b) (1978). The exception's rationale is not difficult to
fathom. Congress presumably knew of the FDA's practice of responding to manufacturer's
inquiries about the safety of food ingredients, and was prepared to regard these responses
as functional equivalents of food additive approvals. Furthermore, the special treatment
accorded substances previously sanctioned by the USDA can be partially explained by the
FDA's traditional deference to that department in the case of meat and poultry products,
a deference that allowed Congress to consider such substances the USDA's concern.
173. 21 C.F.R. § 181.5(b) (1978); Prior-Sanctioned Food Ingredients, 38 Fed. Reg.
12,737 (1973); R. Kingham, Statutory and Administrative Theories by Which FDA Avoids
Applying the Delaney Clause (Nov. 10, 1977)(unpublished manuscript on file with author). Cf. Use of Sodium Nitrite, Sodium Nitrate, Potassium Nitrite, and Potassium
Nitrate, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,456 (1972) (in which the FDA because of its belief that certain
uses of nitrites suspected of posing a carcinogenic risk were prior sanctioned, did not
propose to ban those uses). The FDA might have invoked § 402(a)(l) had it not been
persuaded oftli'e benefits of nitrite. Nothing in the legislative history of the Food Additives
Amendment would suggest that Congress ever contemplated the possibility that a prior
sanctioned ingredient might be found to be carcinogenic. Indeed, Congress appears to
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evaluating the appropriateness of regulatory action under such
circumstances, it may consider some benefits of the ingredient's
use. Thus, the agency once indicated that the capacity of sodium
nitrite to prevent the growth of botulinal toxin in cured meat
products may outweigh any risk of cancer from preformed nitrosamines.174 This assertion is legally pertinent if sodium nitrite
enjoys a prior USDA sanction under the Meat Inspection Act. 175
From a scientific standpoint, however, there is no reason why
ingredients formally sanctioned for use by the FDA or USDA
prior to September 6, 1958, should stand on a different footing,
vis-it-vis Delaney, than ingredients regulated as food additives or
used on the assumption they are GRAS. Nor is there any persuasive theoretical basis for permitting the FDA to consider the
countervailing benefits of one class of ingredients but not of the
others.
4.

Color additives

Congress enacteathe 1960 Color Additive Amendments 176 to
assure the safety of substances used to impart color to foods,
thereby carving out yet one more category of added food constituents to which special rules apply. While the amendments also
apply to substances used to color drugs, devices, and cosmetics,
the following discussion exclusively concerns colors that are used
as ingredients in food. Section 201(t)(l) of the Act defines color
additive broadly:
have given no thought to the possibility that some prior sanctioned ingredients might later
prove to be harmful in any way.
174. See Use of Sodium Nitrite, Sodium Nitrate, Potassium Nitrite, and Potassium
Nitrate, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,456 (1972); Nitrates and Nitrites in Poultry Products, 42 Fed.
Reg. 44,375 (1977). See also General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food
Ingredients, 39 Fed. Reg. 34,194 (1974). The only example the agency cited of benefits
that might legitimately be considered is the antibotulinal effect of sodium nitrite.
175. In the case of a substance shown to induce cancer in laboratory animals, any
opportunity to consider benefits of any kind depends on the substance's prior sanction,
which shelters it against the Delaney Clause. The FDA sometimes has discovered that its
assumptions about the legal status of an ingredient was mistaken. Assistant Secretary
Foreman's letter to FDA Commissioner Kennedy, supra note 168, announcing· that the
USDA has not in fact sanctioned sodium nitrite for use in poultry came as a surprise, and
departed from that department's informal historical position. Because it then had no
evidence that sodium nitrite itself might induce cancer, the FDA was able to devise an
interim solution that permitted the ingredient's limited continued use pending further
scientific studies. See Nitrates and Nitrites in Poultry Products, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,375
(1977). However, confirmation that sodium nitrite is a carcinogen should, under the
USDA's interpretation, automatically terminate its use in poultry products in the absence
of congressional interference.
176. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9.
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The term "color additive" means a material which(A) is a dye, pigment, or other substance made by a process
of synthesis or similar artifice, or extracted, isolated, or otherwise derived, with or without intermediate or final change of
identity, from a vegetable, animal, mineral, or other source
and
(B) when added or applied to a food . . . is capable (alone
cir through reaction with other substance) of imparting color
thereto;
except that such term does not include any material which the
Secretary, by regulation, determines is used (or intended to be
used) solely for a purpose or purposes other than coloring. 177

The FDA has adopted a regulation limiting the circumstances in
which the concluding exception might apply:
For a material otherwise meeting the definition of "color additive" to be exempt from section 706 of the act, on the basis that it
is used (or intended to be used) solely for a purpose or purposes
other than coloring, the material must be used in a way that any
color imparted is clearly unimportant insofar as the appearance,
value, marketability, or consumer acceptability is concerned. (It
is not enough to warrant exemption if conditions are such that the
primary purpose of the material is other than to impart color.) 178

The regulatory requirements for color additives resemble
those for food additives, with certain important distinctions: The
Color Additive Amendments require premarket safety testing and
FDA approval of all substances used to color food. 179 The manufacturer or would-be user of a color additive may petition the
agency for a regulation permitting the color to be used in food.
Before it may approve, or "list," a color, the FDA must find, with
reasonable certainty, that the additive poses no risk to human
health, that it accomplishes its intended effect, and that its use
will not deceive consumers. 180 The agency may impose restrictions
on the use of a color to assure that these criteria are satisfied.
Such restrictions may include limits on levels of use, 181 a require177. 21 U.S.C. § 321(t)(l) (1976).
178. 21 C.F.R. § 70.3(g) (1978). This regulation was not designed by the FDA to
subject food additives which impart color to regulation under the Color Additive Amendments, rather than under the Food Additives Amendment, although it has that effect,
Rather, it was adopted as part of a since-abandoned FDA scheme to subject certain
cosmetic products to premarket clearance. See Toilet Goods Assn. v. Finch, 419 F.2d 21
(2d Cir. 1969).
179. A food containing a color additive that the FDA has not approved is adulterated,
Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, §§ 102(a)(2), 103(b) (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 342(c), 376(a) (1976)).
180. 21 U.S.C. §§ 376(b)(4),(5),(6) (1976); Freedman, supra note 114, at 253.
181. 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(7) (1916).
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ment that the FDA certify individual batches of the color to assure that the color actually used in food is identical to. the substance shown in experiments to be safe, 182 and specification of the
foods in which a color may be used. 183 The FDA has also taken
the position that, in certain instances, it may require informative
labeling on foods that contain a specific color additive in order
to facilitate safe use by consumers. 184
The Color Additive Amendments contain a Delaney Clause
similar in language and identical in principle to the clause that
appears in section 409. 185 This clause precludes approval for food
use of any color additive shown to induce cancer when ingested
by experimental animals. The Color Additive Amendments do
not recognize a category of colors "generally recognized as safe" 186
and do not exclude from the definition of color additive substances that were sanctioned or used prior to 1960. The Delaney
Clause in section 706 thus effectively applies to all food coloring
agents. 187 Accordingly, the FDA could not engage in the kind of
182. 21 U.S.C. § 376(c) (1976). Such a requirement.is not authorized for food additives.
183. See 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(8) (1976).
184. The FDA has proposed to require label declaration of FDC Yellow No. 5 when
used to color foods and ingested drugs, and to prohibit its use in certain drugs for human
use. This proposal springs from evidence that a substantial number of consumers are
allergic to the color. 42 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1977).
185. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 103(b) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1976)), which reads in pertinent part:
A color additive (i) shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use
which will or may result in ingestion of all or part of such additive, if the additive
is found by the Secretary to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if
it is found by the Secretary, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of
the safety of additives for use in food, to induce cancer in man or animal, and (ii)
shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use which will not result in
ingestion of any part of such additive, if, after tests which are appropriate for the
evaluation of the safety of additives for such use, or .after other relevant exposure
of man or animal to such additive, it is found by the Secretary to induce cancer in·
man or animal • . . .
186. This statement requires qualification. Under § 103(b) of the Color Additive
Amendments of 1960, supra note 9 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(4) (1976)), a color
additive shall be deemed suitable and safe for use in food-and thus automatically eligible
for listing-if the FDA has published a finding that the substance is exempt from the
definition of food additive because it is GRAS. This provision does not, however, exempt
any color additive from the requirement of affirmative FDA approval.
187. The obligation to be accurate demands a further qualification. As the next
paragraph of the text explains, the Color Additive Amendments did authorize the FDA
to "provisionally list" colors then in use and believed to be safe, pending the completion
of contemporary toxicological studies necessary to support full approval. As the Color
Additive Amendments are drafted, the Delaney Clause does not.apply to provisionally
listed colors and it would be possible, in theory, to argue that the FDA might lawfully
authorize provisional listing-and continued use-of a carcinogenic color additive. But
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risk-benefit analysis previously suggested for sodium nitrite as a
preservative in meat in evaluating a specific color that had been
shown to be an animal carcinogen. 188
While Congress did not "grandfather" food colors already in
use in 1960, it did accord them temporary special treatment.
Section 203 of the Color Addit~ve Amendments .authorized the
FDA to list "provisionally" colors then in use that were believed
to be safe, in order to allow manufacturers to conduct the kind
of toxicological testing required to support approval under the
new law's scientific standards. 189 The provisional list was designed to permit an orderly transition from bifurcated regulation
in which some colors were subject to little effective control, 100 to
a scheme in which all color additives must be licensed. The only
colors eligible for provisional listing were those in use in 1960.1 91
this argument would be even more fragile in this context than in the case of a once-GRAS
food ingredients. See text at notes 152-54 supra. The Delaney Clause clearly would preclude permanent listing of such a color, and both the text and legislative history of the
1960 amendments make clear that provisional listing was to be temporary for all colors.
In general, a provisional listing would terminate no later than the end of the 21/2 year
period beginning on the date of enactment. However, where necessary to complete scien•
tific testing required for a particular additive, the Secretary could extend this period with
respect to a particular color additive or use, if this is consistent with the protection of the
public health and with the objective of completing these tests as soon as possible. H.R.
REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1960) U.S. CODE CoNo. & Ao. NEWS
2897-98. Moreover, the FDA has left no doubt that it regards evidence of carcinogenicity
as fatal to a provisionally listed food color. Certified Color Mfrs. Assn. v. Matthews, 543
F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Red No. 2, 41 Fed. Reg. 5823 (1976).
188. Sodium nitrite has been used in curing poultry to stabilize or "fix" color. Once
the USDA announced that sodium nitrite was not sanctioned for use prior to the 1958 Food
Additives Amendment, the FDA faced the difficult task of differentiating the uses of this
substance as a food and as a color additive, and determining the applicable statutory
provisions for regulating its use. See 42 Fed. Reg. 44,376 (1977).
189. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 203. This section is not
codified in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
190. Prior to 1960, colors derived from coal-tar dyes were subject to stringent regulation under§ 406(b) of the original 1938 Act, a provision that has since been repealed. As
the FDA ultimately interpreted this provision, which required the agency to certify coaltar dyes shown to be "harmless," it forbade approval of any color that produced toxic
effects at any dosage in animal experiments-an extremely onerous standard. See Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153 (1958). By contrast, colors other thon those
derived from coal-tar dyes were subject merely to the criteria of§ 402(n)(l). The Color
Additive Amendments were designed both to relax the stringency of the "harmless" standard to permit the use of coal-tar colors shown to be safe at the levels proposed to be used,
and to bring other colors under premarketing controls for the first time. See S. REP. No.
795, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
191. This transitional authority conferred by the Color Additive Amendments was
potentially open-ended in that Congress did not specify a finol dote by which nil pre-1960
colors were either to be approved or terminated. Although Congress did prescribe an initial
30-month period, Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 203(n)(2), it also
permitted the FDA to extend this period by regulation when necessary to complete requi-
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Section 203 of the amendments made no provision for adding a
new color to the provisional list to permit continued use while
tests of its safety are being conducted. 192
The FDA has maintained a "provisional list" of color additives for over eighteen years, deleting some colors, such as
F.D.&C. Red No. 2, whose safety came under serious challenge, 193
and permanently listing others as scientific data confirmed their
safety .194 In 1977 the agency publicly committed itself to a timetable for completing tests and evaluation of the nearly seventy remaining provisionally listed colors. 195 By the early 1980s, the FDA
expects that no colors will be provisionally listed; all will either
have been approved or dropped from the list.
The statutory procedures for denying or withdrawing approval of a listed color additive parallel those applicable to food
additives, with an important difference. 196 If the FDA, after publishing a proposal and receiving comments, issues a final order
terminating the "listing" of a color, the filing of objections accompanied by a request for an evidentiary hearing automatically
stays the agency's order pending completion of the hearing. 197
Thus, the FDA may not summarily ban a permanently listed
site testing. By contrast, in the 1958 Food Additives Amendment, Congress specified a
two-year, nonextendable transitional period. However, the 1958 law also built into the
food-additive definition the exception for GRAS ingredients which permitted the FDA to
postpone definitive evaluation of many "additives" for more than 30 years. See S. REP.
No. 2478, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. ConE CONG. & An. NEWS 530308.
192. On at least one occasion, the FDA restored a once provisionally listed color to
the list following a brief absence. The color was FDC Red No. 4, once used by all producers
of maraschino cherries. The agency deleted the color in 1966 following a controversial
study that suggested it might cause teratogenic effects in dogs, but was persuaded to
restore the color's provisional approval when cherry producers demonstrated how little of
the substance consumers would be exposed to. In 1976, the agency once more terminated
the provisional listing for Red No. 4 on the ground that the petitioners for its approval
had never performed the toxicological tests necessary to resolve the earlier questions about
its safety. 41 Fed. Reg. 41,852, 41,854 (1976).
193. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 5823 (1976); 21 C.F.R. § 81.10(0 (1978).
194. E.g., Ferric Ferrocyanide (Iron Blue), 43 Fed. Reg. 54,235 (1978).
195. See Color Additives: Provisional Regulations; Postponement of Closing Dates,
42 Fed. Reg. 6992 (1977).
196. See 21 U.S.C. § 376(b), (c), {e) (1976). The Color Additive Amendments contain
another distinctive feature. This is a provision, 21 U.S.C. § 376(b){5){C), {D) {1976), that
allows the petitioner for a color whose potential carcinogenicity is in issue to request that
the matter be referred to a special committee selected by the National Academy of Sciences. No similar provision is made for resolving the scientific issues involving other
constituents of food, with the exception of pesticide residues on raw agriculture commodities. The authority to refer a color additive to an N.A.S. committee has never formally
been invoked.
197. 21 U.S.C. § 371{e){2) {1976).
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color even upon a finding of carcinogenicity or some more acute
hazard. By contrast, the agency can suspend, without even publishing a proposal or seeking comments, the use of a provisionally
listed color whose safety comes into question. 198

D. Indirect Constituents of Food
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act separately recognizes
three other categories of added food constituents that are not
intended ingredients but become components of food through
their intended use in food production, processing, or distribution.
The three classes are: (1) so-called "indirect" or "incidental" food
additives, such as packaging materials that migrate to food; (2)
animal drugs that can leave residues in tissues (meat, milk, or
eggs) consumed as human food; and (3) pesticide residues on raw
agricultural commodities and in processed foods. 199 The levels at
which these indirect constituents occur typically are much lower
than the levels at which most intended ingredients are used. The
first two categories are subject to some version of the Delaney
Clause. The statutory standards for tolerances for pesticide residues, however, do not accord decisive weight to a finding that a
pesticide induces cancer.
l. Indirect food additives
As many as 10,000 substances200 are used in proximity with

food-in food packaging, in equipment used to process or store
food, in compounds used to clean such equipment-in ways that
permit small amounts to migrate to and become a part of the
food. Such constituents of food are ordinarily not "unavoidable"
in the sense that mercury contamination of swordfish is unavoid198. See Certified Color Mfrs. Assn. v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
199. The FDA estimates that there may be as many as 10,000 indirect food additives
(including indirect GRAS and prior sanctioned substances). Food Additives Hearings,
supra note 159, at 57 . .AB of September 1978, the EPA had set tolerances for the residues
of 268 pesticides on one or more raw agricultural commodities. Of the total of 5,984
individual EPA tolerances, 940 are for chemicals suspected of causing cancer. SUBCOMM.
ON OVERSIGHT AND INVEsTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON lNTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM•
MERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs. CANCER-CAUSING CHEMICALS IN FooD 33 (Comm. Print 1978),
At least 143 pesticides and animal drugs are known to leave chemical residues in meet
and poultry, but the USDA monitors only 46 of these substances occurring in edible
animal tissue. Id. at 24. In this context, "pesticide residues" include only pesticides
purposely used on crops for which they are approved, and not residues that may find their
way into the food supply through drift to other crops or persistence in the environment.
200. Food Additives Hearings, supra note 159, at 57 (statement of Sherwin Gardner,
Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs).
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able. Apparently, swordfish that contain no measurable amounts
of mercury cannot be found, but most foods can either be packaged in materials that do not migrate in detectable amounts or
can be marketed without packaging. Avoidance of the contaminant in the latter case does not require giving up the food.
The full requirements of the Food Additives Amendment
apply to substances that migrate to food from food-contact surfaces. Section 201(s) of the Act defines a food additive as
any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably
be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a
component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food
(including any substance intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding food). 201

A migrating food contact material" can escape the food additive classification if it is generally recognized as safe or if it is the
subject of a prior sanction, and some established packaging materials fall within these exceptions. 202 The procedures for obtaining,
or withdrawing, FDA approval are identical for indirect and direct food additives, and the basic statutory criteria for approval
are the same. Accordingly, an indirect food additive must be
shown, with reasonable certainty, to be safe, and no weight may
be accorded the economic benefits of its use. Similarly, the Delaney Clause squarely applies to indirect food additives and prohibits the use, in applications likely to result in migration to food,
of any substance shown to induce cancer in experimental animals. While application of the Delaney Clause to direct ingredients and animal drugs has proved controversial, its expanding
application to indirect food additives is likely to prove the most
disruptive.
Most materials used in packaging and other food-contact
applications would never be considered for use as food ingredients
because their chemical structure, or experimental evidence, suggests they are probably toxic. This is clearly true for the many
varieties of packaging materials synthesized from hydrocarbon
sources. Furthermore, rapid improvements in chemical analysis
201. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976) (emphasis added).
202. For example, although acrylonitrile polymers in beverage containers are classified as food additives, some meat product wrappings made from acrylonitrile copolymers
have a prior sanction and thus are not classified as food additives. 21 C.F.R. § 181.32
(1978). Some other packaging materials, such as sorbose and acacia, are generally recognized as safe and thus are not subject to regulation as food additives. See 21 C.F.R.
§ § 186.1330 (acacia), .1839 (sorbose) (1978).
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have permitted scientists to measure increasingly small quantities of substances migrating from food contact applications. 203
This development has made it possible to detect traces in food of
packaging materials that once were thought incapable of migration. Improvements in analytical chemistry thus irresistibly enlarge the category of compounds that are potel\tial food additives-and are subject to the Delaney Clause. 204
A recent decision of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, if
upheld on judicial review, may accelerate this development. 205
The decision affects the use 206 of acrylonitrile copolymers to manufacture beverage containers. The FDA initiated proceedings to
revoke existing food additive regulations for four such containers,
because of (1) evidence that residual acrylonitrile monomer is
likely to migrate into the beverages at levels higher than anticipated, and (2) recent experimental data that raise serious questions about the material's safety. 201 The manufacturers contended
that improved fabrication methods would produce a bottle containing so little residual acrylonitrile monomer that no migration
could be detected. The Commissioner rejected this contention as
unpersuasive. He ruled that a material in packaging can be pre203. In 1958, 50 parts per million was the smallest amount of material detectable.
Today, analytical chemistry can detect parts per trillion. See Lyons, Up-to-Date Technology, Out-of-Date Regulations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1978, at§ 4 at 6E, col. 1. For a more
detailed discussion of the improvements in analytical chemistry in recent decades, see
Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,069, 17,075-77 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Assays for Carcinogenic Residues].
204. While the statutory definition of "food additive" does not on its face require
evidence of actual migration, it might be difficult for the FDA to explain why a substance
that had been detected in food, even though at very low levels, was not potentially a food
-additive. The FDA is reportedly exploring ways of limiting its obligation to search for
minute migrants by establishing criteria for detection methods similar to those it promulgated for animal drugs. See notes 237-50 infra and accompanying text.
205. Acrylonitrile Copolymers Used to Fabricate Beverage Containers: Final Decision, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,528 (1977). Petitions for review of the Commissioner's decision were
later filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where argument
was heard earlier this year. Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, No. 77-2023 and consolidated cases
Nos. 77-2024, 77-2026, and 77-2032 (March 15, 1979).
206. Acrylonitrile copolymers had received informal FDA approval for use in some
food contact applications as early as 1948. Acrylonitrile Copolymers Intended for Use in
Contact with Food, 41 Fed. Reg. 23,940, 23,941 (1976).
In 1976, the agency amended the existing interim food additive regulation, 21 C.F.R.
§ 121.2010 (1976) (recodified at § 180.22 (1978)), to allow the use of acrylonitrile copolymers to fabricate containers for nonalcoholic beverages. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,940 (1976). The
history of the FD A's handling of acrylonitrile is recounted in the agency's 1976 amendment
and in the Commissioner's decision, supra note 205.
207. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,528 (1977).
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sumed "to become a component of food," within the-meaning of
section 201(s), even though available methods of analysis cannot
detect migration, if evidence demonstrates that the material can
diffuse into packaged food. 208 This presumption may be defeated
only if the petitioner can prove that diffusion does not occur when
the packaging contains lower residual levels of the material. 209
The Delaney Clause will increasingly be implicated in regulatory decisions involving indirect additives because many chemicals used in the manufacture of food contact materials are suspected or unequivocal carcinogens. Realization of this fact is
partly a result of accumulating evidence of the effects of industrial exposure, as in the case of workers engaged in the manufacture of vinyl chloride and acrylonitrile. 210 It also results from
demands stimulated by other regulatory agencies, notably the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration211 and the Environmental Protection Agency, for toxicological evaluation of industrial chemicals. 212
Scientific developments on two fronts are therefore likely to
precipitate application of the Delaney Clause to compounds
whose presence in food could not have been predicted, much less
detected, only a few years ago. Enforcement of the Food Additives
Amendment in this context may produce unexpected results.
208. The evidence that the Commissioner relied on consisted of tests conducted on
older containers that had higher concentrations of acrylonitrile monomer, which was
shown to migrate at low levels into beverages and food-simulating solvents. The Commissioner stated that, although the concentration of acrylonitrile monomer in the newer
bottles had been reduced, the observation of migration in the older containers made it
reasonable to expect some migration from the newer containers as well. Id. at 48,530.
209. See id. at 48,530-31. Some readers of the Commissioner's decision were initially
skeptical that such a showing could ever be made. Reportedly, however, manufacturers
of polyvinyl chloride another plastic packaging material of considerable commercial importance and a frank carcinogen in man as well as laboratory animals, have preliminarily
persuaded the FDA's Bureau of Foods that they have devised a method of manufacture
that prevents migration of residual vinyl chloride monomer. The method reduces the
residual monomer to the lowest achievable levels during synthesis, and vacuum-strips the
material to eliminate all remaining monomer to a level below the capability of chemical
analysis. In addition, the manufacturers have proferred plausible support for a theory
that, at very low levels, the residual monomer is bound within the plastic and unable to
migrate. See 20 Fooo CHEMICAL NEWS, October 9, 1978, at 7.
210. See Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,762 (1978); Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890 (1974).
211. See Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a
Potential Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977).
212. S~e Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens:
Interim Guidelines and Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976); Pesticide Programs: Registration, Reregistration, and Classification Procedures, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,242 (1975). See also
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (Supp. 1979).
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Unlike most intentional ingredients, these "new" food additives,
such as acrylonitrile, are found (if at all) only at very low partsper-billion in packaged food. But the Delaney Clause flatly forbids use of a carcinogenic material for food packaging if it is likely
to migrate to food in any quantity, 213 and the clause could reach
other, more remote, uses of the material, such as conveyor belts
and water pipes made from vinyl chloride. 214 Furthermore, section
409 does not allow any showing of an additive's special utility to
overcome a finding of carcinogenicity. The law appears to make
no allowance for the fact that the risk posed by migrating quantities of food packaging material, while not negligible, is likely to
be considerably less than that posed by most direct food additives, which are used at much higher levels. 215
213. The legislative history of the Food Additives Aniendment does not reveal
whether Congress fully appreciated the potential interaction between the expansive definition of "food additive" and the Delaney Clause. The House Report discusses both
"intentional" and "incidental" additives together and lists examples considered illustrative of goth ca~.These include "substances intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding
food." H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Seas. 3 (1958). Congressman Delaney explained
that one event which had prompted him to introduce his amendment was the use of a
pesticide chemical known to induce cancer, 104 CONG. REc. 17,420 (1958), but he failed
to note that pesticide residues fall outside the coverage of § 409 and, thus, beyond the
reach of the Clause that bears his name. While some members questioned the wisdom of
Delaney's proposed definition, none cited cases in which its application would be unsound.
104 CONG. REc. at 17,421-22.
The Senate Report indicates that incidental food additives were to be subject to the
Delaney Clause, just as direct additives, and went on to observe,
[W]e want the record to show that in our opinion the bill is aimed at preventing
the addition to the food our people eat of any substances the ingestion of which
reasonable people would expect to produce not just cancer but any disease or disability. In short, we believe the bill reads and means the same with or without
the inclusion of the [Delaney Clause]. This is also the view of the Food and Drug
Administration.
S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958).
Although not technically a part of the formal legislative history of the Food Additives
Amendment, the original report of the Delaney Committee provides examples of the type
of compounds the proponents of the clause hoped to reach. The report alluded to the
problem of indirect chemical additives, citing antibiotics which were used to treat dairy
cattle and which subsequently appeared in milk products. The report also stated that the
problem extended beyond pesticides and chemical additives, and included paper, fiber,
and plastics used as food containers, wrappers, and handling equipment. H.R. REP. No.
2356, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1952).
214. For a revealing discussion of the FDA's current position on polyvinyl chloride
water pipes, see Vinyl Chloride Polymers In Contact with Food, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,529,
40,534-35 (1975). See also Doniger, supra note 130.
215. The FDA has banned the use of acrylonitrile bottles, which yield a concentration
ofacrylonitrile in the bottled beverage ofless than 10 parts per billion (ppb). 42 Fed. Reg.
45,828, 45,829 (1977). In contrast, saccharin, a direct food additive, is used in concentra-
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2. Animal drug residues
Compounds administered to food-producing animals as
drugs or feed supplements compose a second category of indirect
constituents of human food, for they may leave residues in meat,
milk, or eggs. Animal drugs and animal feed additives are both
subject to the Delaney Clause, b~t with an important qualification created by a special amendment to the clause passed by
Congress in 1962. Before examining this qualification, a brief
summary of the regulatory framework for animal drugs and feed
additives is in order.
Compounds added to animal feed are subject to the Food
Additives Amendment of 1958 on the same terms as intentional
ingredients of human food; the Act's definition of "food" specifically embraces "articles used for food or drink for man or other
animals. " 216
Accordingly, a substance added to animal feed must be generally recognized as safe, be used in· accordance with a prior sanction issued by the FDA or the USDA, or be the subject of an
approved food additive regulation. The procedures for approval
of animal feed additives generally do not differ from those applicable to ingredients of human food. 217 The central inquiry is
usually whether the ingredient will be safe for the animals to
which it will be fed. However, the FDA has not undertaken a
formal review of the safety of animal feed, nor has it established
any system for affirming the general recognition of specific ingredients as safe.218
Prior to the passage of the Animal Drug Amendments of
tions of approximately 400 parts per million (12 milligrams per fluid ounce). See 21 C.F.R.
§ 180.37(d)(l) (1978).
The FDA is currently considering ways of escaping from this dilemma. One possibility
under discussion would be to establish a level of migration below which § 409 would not
apply, a level so low that the risk posed by any migrating material could be ignored. As
the next section explains, the FDA has devised a similar approach for dealing with residues of carcinogenic animal drugs. The dist_inctive feature of that approach is that the
residue level which the agency would ignore, i.e., allow to go uncontrolled, is keyed to the
carcinogenic potency of the compound. This feature can more readily be reconciled with
the text of the statute governing animal drugs. See notes 237-59 infra, and accompanying
text. It remains to be seen whether under the present statute FDA could justify a similar
approach to indirect food additives, which are regulated under a provision of the Act that
appears to speak in terms of the occurrence, or likely occurrence, of physical migration.
See § 201(s) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976).
216. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (1976). The definition of food additive in § 201(s) does not
differentiate between food for humans and food for animals. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976).
217. See notes 132-39 supra and accompanying text.
218. See text at note 160 supra.
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1968, 219 animal drugs were potentially subject to the general requirements of section 505, which was applicable to all new drugs,
veterinary as well as human. 220 That section, from 1962 on, required that a new animal drug be proved effective as well as safe
for the animals to which it would be administered. 221 Furthermore, a drug to be used in food-producing animals in a fashion
that could leave residues in the edible tissues had to meet the
food safety requirements of the Food Additives Amendment. 222
The 1968 amendments established a consolidated licensure procedure, but did not alter the substantive standards applicable to
animal drugs that may contaminate human food. 223
The standards applicable to drugs used in food-producing
animals thus require the FDA to balance the risks and benefits
of a drug for the animals and to verify the safety vel non of any
residues that might occur in food. For an animal feed additive,
the agency must evaluate the safety of the compound under the
criteria of section 409, including the Delaney Clause. As they
apply to animal drugs and feed additives, however, the criteria
were significantly changed in 1962. Following the passage of the
Food Additives Amendment in 1958, the FDA concluded that no
compound found to induce cancer in laboratory animals could be
approved for use as an additive to animal feed, on the unexceptionable ground that the Delaney Clause prohibited the approval
· of any carcinogenic "food additive." This interpretation precluded the marketing of a number of compounds that promised
significant savings in the cost of producing livestock. Moreover,
it preserved a monopoly for manufacturers of implantable dosage
forms of such compounds, which could escape the food additives
law if the FDA concluded that they could not "reasonably be
expected to become a component offood." 224 The notable example
219. Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, supra note 9.
220. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976).
221. A "new animal drug" is one that is not generally recognized as safe and effective
for its intended uses. 21 U.S.C. § 32l(w) (1976). See U.S.C. § 32l(p) (1976) (parallel
definition of "new drug" for humans). Congress thus excluded from the requirement for
premarket approval drugs-human as well as animal-that already enjoyed a reputation
among scientific experts as safe and effective. As a practical matter, however, virtually
all new chemical entities introduced since 1962 have been subjected to the premarket
approval process.
222. This result followed from the Act's definition of food additive, which includes
any substance whose intended use "results or may reasonably be expected to result,
directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component ..• of any food." 21 U.S.C. § 32l(s)
(1976).
223. See S. REP. No. 1308, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968).
224. This interpretation, which could hardly be said to fly in the face of the statutory
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was diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic estrogen believed to be
an animal carcinogen. As part of the Drug Amendments of 1962, 225
Congress addressed these problems by adding the following, qualifying language to the flat prohibition of the Delaney Clause:
{T]his proviso shall not apply with respect to the use of a substance as an ingredient of feed for animals which are raised for food
production, if the Secretary finds (i) that, under the conditions of
use and feeding specified in proposed labeling and reasonably certain to be followed in practice, such additive will not adversely
affect the animals for which such feed is intended, and (ii) that no
residue of the additive will be found (by methods of examination
prescribed or approved by the Secretary by regulations . . .) in
any edible portion of such animal after slaughter or in any food
yielded by or derived from the livtng animal . . . .226

Known as the "DES proviso," this language requires the
FDA to prescribe analytical methods for measuring residues of a
carcinogenic drug or feed additive in animal tissues (meat, milk,
and eggs) used for human food. This amended version of the
Delaney Clause is implemented through the procedures for licensing animal feed additives and new animal drugs. m Under current
FDA practice, the manufacturer of a new animal drug or animal
feed additive that might be a carcinogen must conduct chronic
toxicity tests of the compound (and selected metabolites) to determine whether the Delaney Clause applies to the product. If the
drug is found to induce cancer, 228 the manufacturer must submit
chemical analytical and confirmatory methods adequate to detect unlawful residues.
The formal administrative process for the approval of new
language, also aggravated other competitive inequities. Some producers of additives to
animal feed had obtained informal FDA approval for their products in the mid-1950s.
These approvals, in the agency's view, constituted "prior sanctions" within the meaning
of§ 201(s), 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976). Thus, some manufacturers were able to market feed
supplements that promoted growth while others were stifled by the FDA's interpretation
of the new law. Address by Richard Kingham, Course on Food and Drug Law for FDA
Scientists, at University of Virginia School of Law (August 18, 1978).
225. Drug Amendments of 1962, § 104(f)(l), Pub. L. No. 87-781, §104(f)(l), 76 Stat.
785 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976)) H.R. REP. No. 2464, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 2526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1962) (Conference Report).
226. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (c)(3)(A) (1976) (emphasis added). Essentially identical
language was incorporated in the Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, and
was later included in the provisions that Congress enacted in 1968 to govern approval of
new animal drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 301b (d)(l)(H) (1976).
227. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 348, 360b (1976); Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note
203, at 17,069.
228. Perez, Human Safety Data Collection and Evaluation for the Approval of New
Animal Drugs, 3 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVT. HEALTH, 837, 852-53 (1977).
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animal drugs resembles that for human food and animal feed
additives, with comparable opportunities for a formal evidentiary
hearing on ·any denial of approval and for judicial review. Essentially the same procedures must be followed if the FDA wishes to
withdraw approval of a compound on the ground that it fails to
meet the requirements of the modified Delaney Clause or is otherwise unsafe for humans. 229
Before approving a new animal drug, the FDA must determine that the drug is effective for its intended uses in target
animals (including, if pertinent, growth promotion), that it will
be safe for the animals, and, if the animals are sources of human
food, that any residues will, with reasonable certainty, be safe for
human consumption. 230 In applying the first two criteria, the
agency makes a rough risk-benefit analysis of the kind it conducts
in evaluating drugs for human use. The third criterion, however,
embodies the basic safety standard of the Food Additives Amendment, which, in the agency's view, does not permit balancing any
risk to human health against benefits to animal husbandry or
food production. 231 In substance, the drug residue is treated sim229. There is a notable distinction between the statutory procedures applicable to
new animal drugs and those applicable to animal feed additives. Under § 612, the FDA
may not withdraw the approval of a drug without first according the manufacturer an
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing unless the Secretary of HEW personally determines
that the drug poses an "imminent hazard" to human health. See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)
(1976). Until very recently, the FDA had construed "imminent hazard" to include only
situations in which the risk of injury is both serioUB and immediate. Thus, the cancer
hazard associated with smoking cigarettes would not constitute an "imminent hazard"
becaUBe of the lengthy latency of the illness, coupled with its close association with
prolonged exposure. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Commerce Committee has severely criticized this narrow definition, contending that
"imminent hazard" referred to the potential serioUBness of injury and had little to do with
the length of time necessary for its occurrence or its likelihood. StracoMM. ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON lNn:RSTATE AND FOREIGN C0!',1MERCE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESs. FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULA.TORY REFORM 293-96 (Comm. Print 1976),
The same imminent-hazard standard applies to human drugs. The Secretary of HEW
has only invoked this standard once. See Phenformin: Public Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 21,846
(1977). This proposed ruling, involving a drug in-wide use for the treatment of diabetes,
may well liberalize the FDA's historical interpretation of the "imminent hazard" language. Without the involvement of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare the
FDA could make the withdrawal of a food or feed additive regulation effective pending a
hearing simply by refusing to stay its action, even if objections requiring a formal evidentiary hearing were submitted. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(e) (1976).
230. See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d) (1976).
231. The decision in Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia Inc. v. FDA, 496 F.2d 976 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), suggests a contrary conclusion. However, the court's dictum fails to distinguish
between the criteria applicable to human drugs and those applicable to animal drugs,
which in effect incorporate the "no benefit" formula of the Food Additives Amendment.
See Freedman, supra note 114, at 268-70. Moreover, the court's implication would anorna-
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ply as another type of indirect food additive. Accordingly, if an
animal drug would leave unsafe residues in food, the FDA would
not approve it even if its use might lower production costs, reduce
meat prices, or control animal disease. The agency has never
seriously considered requiring that meat derived from treated
animals be labeled to alert consumers to the potential risks from
drug residues. 232 Moreover, most meat and many poultry products
are packaged at the point of sale, which would make it difficult
to enforce such a labeling requirement comprehensively.
The Act does not accord special treatment based upon their
prior use to residue-producing animal drugs, as it does for certain
classes of intentional ingredients of human food or animal feed. 233
The law does not require premarketing approval of animal drugs
that are generally recognized as safe and effective, 234 and it does
"grandfather" certain products marketed prior to 1938 or 1962.235
As a practical matter, however, neither escape route is available
to most currently marketed animal drugs that are capable of
leaving residues in human food, nor would either be open to any
new product. Accordingly, the modified Delaney Clause can be
lously permit the FDA to consider the·benefits of human food "additives" administered
to food-producing animals in the form of drugs but not the benefits of constituents resulting from the use of additives in the feed of such animals, which remain regulated under
§ 409.
232. The FDA probably could assert authority over the labeling of retail packages of
meat and poultry products, although the agency has historically deferred to USDA regulation in this area. The practical difficulties posed by the jurisdictional overlap aside, the
FDA has found in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authority for comparable labeling
requirements for other products. For example, the FDA has required manufacturers of hair
dyes containing coal-tar dyes to include a warning that the product contains an ingredient
that can penetrate the skin and which causes cancer in laboratory animals. Coal Tar Hair
Dyes Containing 4-Methoxyl-M-Phenylenediamine or 4-Methoxy-M-Phenylenediamine
Sulfate, 43 Fed. Reg. 1101 (1978). The authority of the FDA to require warnings about
ingredients has been upheld by the District Court for the District of Columbia. Cosmetic,
Toiletry & Fragrance Assn. v. Schmidt, 409 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976). Although in that
case the agency relied on the "false or misleading" provison applicable to cosmetics, an
identical provision applies to food. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1976) with 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(a)(l) (1976). For a discussion of the overlap between FDA and USDA jurisdiction
over labeling of meat and poultry products, see 5 SEN. COMM, ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
95TH CONG., 1ST SESs., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS 113 (Comm. Print 1977).
233. There are relatively few prior sanctioned additives to animal feed, although the
FDA did countenance the marketing of DES as an animal feed additive by a few manufacturers prior to 1958. The agency has subsequently sought to limit these approvals and to
extinguish them at any opportunity, e.g., when a manufacturer's plant burned down. The
few prior sanctioned feed additives are subject to the standards of 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l)
(1976). See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
234. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360b(a), 32l(w) (1976).
235. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(l), (w)(l) (1976). The 1962 Drug Amendments Act contained
additional transitional provisions, see Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107, 76 Stat. 781 (1962).
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considered potentially applicable to almost all drugs used in foodproducing animals, a significant number of which are suspected
laboratory animal carcinogens. 236
Precisely for this reason Congress's 1962 modification of the
Delaney Clause has long been controversial. The FDA has assumed that the amended clause does not automatically forbid
approval of a carcinogenic drug or animal feed additive simply on
a finding that its use may result in some residues, however small.
Rather, the agency contends that the law permits approval if the
sponsor submits analytical methods capable of measuring-and
thereby of controlling-any residues that may be unsafe. 237 Until
1977, however, the FDA had not adopted formal criteria for evaluating analytical methods offered to control unsafe residues. It
reviewed each new drug individually and, generally, required that
no residues should be detectable by the best analytical method
then available. 238 Because some animal drugs have been tested
chronically and found carcinogenic only after they were initially
marketed, however, a few drugs obtained approval on the basis
of assay methods less sensitive than might now be prescribed. 230
Improvements in analytical chemistry have affected the
FDA's efforts to control animal drug residues almost as dramatically as its regulation of indirect food additives. The agency has
initiated proceedings to withdraw approval of DES implants because the drug has been found to leave residues at levels that
236. In 1972 Dr. Klemens Johnson, former Director of FDA Bureau of Veterinary
Medicine's Division of Veterinary Medical Review, prepared a 36-page memorandum
criticizing the agency's method for detecting drug residues in food animals. Dr. Johnson
also assembled a list of 19 animal drugs which were potentially carcinogenic but for which
no adequate method existed for detecting residues. This "Johnson Memorandum" was
later the target of a congressional investigation that resulted from the Bureau Director's
attempts to recall and suppress all copies of the memorandum. For a full discussion of
the memorandum and subsequent investigation, see HEW Review Panel on New Drug
Regulation, Report of the Special Counsel's Investigation of Allegations Relating to the
Bureau of Veterinary Medicine Food and Drug Administration 34-82 (May 1977).
237. Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203, at 17,086-87.
238. Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for
Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic Residues in Edible Products of Animals, 42 Fed. Reg.
10,412 (1977).
239. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. OF OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGO·
LATORY REFORM 288 (Comm. Print 1976) (nitrofurans); Diethylstilbestrol: Notice of Opportunity for Hearing on Proposal To Withdraw Approval of New Animal Drug Applications,
41 Fed. Reg. 1804 (1976) (DES); Regulation of Diethylstilbestrol, iiJ75: Joint Hearing.~
Before the Sub comm. on Health of the Sen.ate Comm. on l,abor and Public Wei/are and
the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm, on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1975) (Johnson Memorandum).
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cannot be detected by the methods accepted a decade ago. 2~0 And,
as in the case of indirect food additives, the capacity of analytical
methods to measure even smaller residues will enlarge the class
of animal drugs and feed additives that are subject to the strictures of the modified Delaney Clause. 241 By contrast with the
Delaney Clause itself, the DES proviso makes the detection of
residues in edible animal tissues, rather than the addition of the
compound to animals or their feed, the critical inquiry. This focus
of the proviso has enabled the FDA to regulate carcinogenic animal drugs and feed additives in a fashion that might logically be
applied to other classes of indirect food constituents as well. 2~2 In
a February, 1977 regulation, Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic Residues in Edible Products, 2~3 the
agency announced the standards it would apply in determining
the level of residues an assay for a carcinogenic animal drug or
feed additive must be capable of measuring if the compound is
to be approved. As reproposed in 1979, the regulation describes
the agency's current criteria for deciding what residues may
safely be allowed to go undetected. 244
The 1979 proposal embodies several basic requirements:
1. It mandates chronic testing of any compound that the
FDA concludes may leave carcinogenic residues in human food. m
2. It dictate~ that the FDA, by extrapolating from the re240. See Diethylstilbestrol: Notice of Opportunity for Hearing on Proposal To Withdraw Approval of New Animal Drug Applications, 41 Fed. Reg. 1804 (1976). An initial
decision by the FDA AdministrlJtive Law Judge has upheld the withdrawal of approval
of the use of DES. See Proposal To Withdraw Approval of the New Animal Drug Application for Diethylstilbestrol, [1978 Transfer Binder] Foon DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH)
iJ 88,198 (1978).
241. See Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203, at 17,075-77.
242. See notes 213-15 supra and accompanying text.
243. The FDA's February 1977 regulation was set aside by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on the ground that the agency had failed to afford
manufacturers an adequate opportunity to comment on the scientific rationale for its final
criteria. Animal Health Institute v. Califano, __ F. Supp. __ (D.D.C. 1978). The
court's opinion, however, does not suggest that the agency's basic approach is suspect. In
March 1979 the FDA republished its criteria as a proposal and invited further comment.
Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203. The reproposed criteria and the
agency's discussion of them differ in only a few details from the version promulgated in
ostensibly final form two years earlier. Because the 1979 proposal represents the FDA's
latest statement of its policy respecting carcinogenic animal drugs, however, the balance
of the discussion in text refers to that document.
244. While on its face the proposal merely prescribes the standard for detecting
residues, it effectively sets the criteria for establishing a tolerance. If the FDA-approved
test cannot detect a residue, that residue is legally not present even if a more sensitive
analytical technique might detect it.
245. Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203, at 17,078-81, 17,084-86.
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suits of positive chronic tests, e.g., tests that demonstrate carcinogenicity, shall project the level of potential residues in the average diet (of meat, milk, or eggs) that corresponds to a one in one
million individual lifetime risk of cancer. The proposal terms this
risk "acceptable," emphasizing that the risk is only one of many
to which individuals are exposed and comparable to that posed
by other materials that are considered safe. 248
3. Finally, the 1979 proposal specifies that before a compound may qe approved, the sponsor must provide the FDA with
a practicable247 assay method capable of measuring residues at a
level that will assure that no individual is exposed to greater than
the extrapolated "acceptable" risk. 248 To increase the probability
that actual residues would not exceed the level prescribed, the
drug's labeling will specify the scientifically determined period
prior to slaughter during which the drug should not be administered or implanted. 249 In substance, the agency is saying that if
the potential residues of a carcinogenic animal drug in food will
not increase any individual's chance of getting cancer by more
than one in one million, those residues may be ignored.
Like the February, 1977 regulation, the 1979 proposal does
not contemplate that the FDA will balance the risks and benefits
of animal drugs or feed additives. It simply specifies a maximum
level of risk-expressed as a level of drug residues that the approved assay method might theoretically fail to detect-which
the agency will consider "acceptable." For most carcinogenic animal drugs and feed additives, the sensitivity of an acceptable
assay-and thus the level of "permissible" undetectable residues-will have to be in the very low parts-per-billion range. This
246. Id. at 17,087-93. The only statutory support for the FDA's .designation of an
"acceptable risk" of 1 in 1,000,000 is the obligation imposed by the DES proviso to develop
some criteria for approving assay methods. The FDA stated that such a risk level could
be considered of insignificant public health concern because it was the maximum, and
therefore unlikely, human risk level. Id. at 17,092. The specified level of risk is the risk
for an individual who consumes the maximum residue levels every day over a lifetime,
and that level assumes that meat products constitute one-third of the total human diet.
From these conservative assumptions, the FDA believes that the most likely human risk
is several orders of magnitude less than the theoretical "acceptable risk." Id.
247. Id. at 17,098-101.
248. In some cases, the test sensitivity prescribed will be only indirectly related to
the acceptable level of residue. Because many animal drug residues are metabolic byproducts of the ingested drug, the presence of any residue is often calculated from measurements of these by-products.
249. Id. at 17,101-03. The proposal specifies, it should be noted, that the approved
assay method must reveal no detectable residues when a drug is used as intended. Otherwise, the drug cannot be approved.
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will strain, and perhaps exceed, the capability of most analytical
methods currently approved for animal drugs. 250
3. Pesticide residues

Residues of chemicals used to control animals and insects
that threaten crops constitute a third class of undesired but not
unexpected food constituents. Pesticide residues often remain on
raw agricultural commodities after they have been harv:ested and
prepared for consumer purchase without further procef:lsing. Residues also appear in processed foods made from raw commodities
to which pesticides have been applied. As is outlined below, the
present law treats these two situations differently. 251
Federal regulation of pesticide residues differs from the pattern of the categories of food constituents previously discussed
because the primary responsibility for determining permissible
levels of human exposure rests with the Environmental Protection Agency, not with the FDA. 252 Most pesticides are subject to
250. Relying on its understanding of Congress's objective in enacting the original
Delaney Clause, the FDA's 1977 regulation specified that if a practicable assay were
developed that was more sensitive than the agency's criteria demanded, it would require
that the new method be used. 42 Fed. Reg. at 10,418-19. The FDA's preamble conceded
that the legislative history of the DES proviso provides no clear indication of Congress's
intent. One interpretation of the· DES proviso is that it merely permits the use of drugs
that have conclusively been shown to leave no residues. The agency rejected this interpretation on the ground that it would render the clause a "Catch-22" because modern methods Qf chemical analysis have confirmed that any drug will leave some residues, albeit
perhaps below the level of detection.
The FDA's 1977 decision was controversial: One of the regulation's objectives was to
provide some stability in the regulation of animal drugs, and to forestall continuous
pressure to develop even more sensitive methods for detecting residues. The agency's
decision would not have avoided the uncertainty posed by the possible development of
new assays capable of detecting residues below the "acceptable risk" level. Without explanation, the 1979 proposal omits the qualification that the FDA may later demand use
of a more sensitive assay than the one required by the agency's criteria.
251. Residues may also contaminate commodities other than those on which pesticides are used, through drift following initial application or persistence in the environment. When this occurs, the FDA currently regulates the residues as environmental contaminants under §§ 402(a) and 406, 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a), 346 (1976). Thus, a single
pesticide may be subject to regulation under both § 406 and § 408 of the Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 346, 346a (1976). But see United States v. Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974).
The discussion here exclusively concerns federal efforts to regulate residues on raw agricultural commodities for which a pesticide has been specifically approved and residues in
processed foods derived from those commodities.
252. Responsibility for this function formerly rested with the FDA, and authority to
register pesticides with the Department of Agriculture. See Reukauf, Regulation of Agricultural Pesticides, 62 lowA L. REv. 909, 910-11 (1977). The reassignment in 1970 of
authority for establishing tolerances under § 408 still left the FDA with primary responsibility for monitoring marketed foods to assure compliance within EPA tolerances. Reorg.
Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app. II, at 60 (Supp. 1979).
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regulation under two statutes. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 253 requires licensure of any
pesticide distributed for use in the United States. Sections 408
and 402(a)(2)(B) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act forbid the
distribution of raw or processed foods bearing pesticide residues
that have not been sanctioped by the EPA. 2.54 The safety of food
for human consumption is the concern of the latter provisions.
Under FIFRA, every pesticide used in the United States
must be "registered," i.e., licensed, by the EPA. 255 A pesticide
"shall" be registered if, in addition to meeting other requirements
not pertinent here, "when used in accordance with widespread
and commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."2.5s Congress has
defined this standard to forbid "any unreasonable risk to man or
the environment, taking into account the economic, social and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide." 257
Under this broad language, the EPA considers the full range of a
pesticide's possible health effects, including its capacity to induce cancer, 258 and is empowered, indeed obligated, to weigh
against these risks a pesticide's ability in eradicating pests and
promoting food production. 259 FIFRA does not preclude registration of a pesticide that induces cancer in laboratory animals,
although the EPA has relied on such evidence to terminate registration of several compounds and has established a presumption
against initial or continuing registration of pesticides that are
recognized or suspect animal carcinogens. 260 In the registration
253. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136 (1976). In 1972, Congress substantially revamped the existing statutory scheme for pesticide control when it passed the Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified in scattered
sections of 7, 15, & 21 U.S.C.). That law provided a transitional period to permit reregistration, in accordance with new, more demanding standards of safety, of all pesticides .
previously registered under FIFRA. In 1978, Congress again amended the statutory
scheme for pesticides control to permit the conditional registration of pesticides while the
data necessary for complete registration is being generated. The amendments also seek
to expedite the registration process by permitting the EPA to register pesticides on a
generic basis. See Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819.
254. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(2), 346a(a) (1976).
255. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1976).
256. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1976).
257. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(bb) (1976).
258. Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens, 41
Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976).
259. Id. See also Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 40 C.F.R. § 162.11 (1978).
260. The EPA has established a set of rebuttable presumptions against registration
to aid in determining whether a pesticide is likely to cause unreasonable adverse effects.
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process, the EPA is concerned principally with the health of persons exposed to the pesticide during its application, while harvesting or transporting crops, or in the environment generally.
The agency regulates the compound's risks as a potential contaminant of food under sections 408 and 409 of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.
A pesticide that is applied to a commodity consumed by
humans might "reasonably be expected to become a component"261 of food, whether the commodity is marketed in a raw
state or after processing. To exclude pesticide residues from its
compass, the statutory definition of food additive excepts pesticide chemicals "in or on a raw agricultural commodity," and thus
exempts such constituents of food from the requirements of section 409. 262 At the same time, section 402(a)(2)(B) of the Act
deems a food adulterated "if it is a raw agricultural commodity
and it bears or contains a pesticide chemical which is unsafe
within the meaning of section 408(a)." 263 This provision was
added to the Act in 1954 as part of the legislation that authorized
the FDA to establish tolerances for residues of registered pesticides on raw agricultural commodities. 264 Pursuant to this authority, which appears in section 408 of the Act, the EPA determines
the quantity of a pesticide that may remain on a raw commodity
when it enters interstate commerce. While FIFRA requires the
registration of all pesticides, section 408(a) of the Food, Drug, .and
A rebuttable presumption arises if the pesticide exceeds specified criteria for any of three
types of effects: (1) acute toxicity; (2) chronic toxicity; or (3) lack of emergency treatments
for exposed humans. Chronic toxicity is defined in terms of oncogenic (carcinogenic) or
mutagenic effects. These rebuttable presumptions shift to the applicant or registrant the
burden of demonstrating for a pesticide initially found to be chronically toxic that (1)
when considered with proposed restrictions on use and common practices of use, the
pesticide will not concentrate, persist, or accrue to levels to have any significant chronic
adverse effects; or (2) that the EPA's determination that it exceeds the criteria for risk
was in error. In addition, the applicant may submit evidence to demonstrate that the
economic, social, and environmental benefits of the use-of the pesticide outweigh the risk
of use. See 40 C.F.R. § 162.45 (1978).
While the EPA is particularly attentive to the carcinogenic potential of pesticides,
see Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens, 41 Fed.
Reg. 21,402 (1976), the agency may still permit registration of a carcinogenic pesticide if
its economic benefits outweigh the health risk. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs.,
FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 198 (Comm. Print 1976) (letter of Russell
Train, Director of EPA).
261. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976).
262. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(l) (1976).
263. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (1976).
264. Act of July 22, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-518, § 2, 68 Stat. 511 (1954)(current version
at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (1976)).
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Cosmetic Act requires a tolerance only for "[a]ny poisonous or
deleterious pesticide chemical which is not generally recognized
. . . as safe for use. " 265 Accordingly, residues of a pesticide that
are GRAS do not require formal government approval. 266
Section 408(b) prescribes the criteria the EPA must use to
establish tolerances:
[T]he Secretary shall give appropriate consideration, among
other relevant factors, (1) to the necessity for the production of an
adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply; (2) to the other
ways in which the consumer may be affected by the same pesticide
chemical or by other substances that are poisonous or deleterious;
and (3) to the opinion [of the Secretary of Agriculture as] submitted with a certmcation of usefulness [of the pesticide] . . . . In
carrying out the provisions of this section relating to the establishment of tolerances, the Secretary may establish the tolerance applicable with respect to the use of any pesticide chemical' in or
on any raw agricultural commodity at zero level if the scientific
data before the Secretary does not justify the establishment of a
greater tolerance. 267

Conspicuously, this language does not mention the risk of
cancer, and since a pesticide residue on a raw commodity is excepted from the definition of a food additive, 268 the Delaney
Clause does not apply. The EPA could, therefore, establish a
finite tolerance for a pesticide that has been shown to induce
cancer in experimental animals (indeed in man) but that, because of its utility, remains eligible for registration under
FIFRA. 269 In short, the Act permits the approval of constituents
of food-residues of pesticides on raw commodities-that could
not lawfully be added as direct ingredients. This inconsistency is
amplified by the Act's distinctive treatment of pesticide residues
in processed foods.
While many types of processing substantially reduce the levels of pesticide residues on raw agricultural commodities, few
265. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a) (1976).
266. Few pesticides qualify for this exception because by design, they are biologically
active substances capable of causing adverse effects in living organisms.
267. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1976).
268. See note 262 supra and accompanying text.
269. So far as I am aware, this has rarely occurred. One recent example occurred in
the summer of 1977, when the EPA authorized the use of a carcinogenic pesticide, BAAM,
on two critical crops in Oregon and Idaho. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,437 (1977). A similar exemption
was granted in February 1978 for certain crops in California and Utah. 43 Fed. Reg. 5884
(1978). In both cases, the EPA determined that the economic consequences of failing to
permit the pesticide's use outweighed the minimal health hazard of its limited use and
occurrence as residues in foods.
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processes eliminate all such residues. 27°Congress therefore recognized that some provision was needed to control pesticide residues that persist on raw commodities used to make finished
foods, e.g., canned vegetables. Accordingly, the exception for pesticide chemicals in the Act's definition of food additive extends
only to residues "in or on a raw agricultural commodity. " 271 A
pesticide residue on a pro~essed food, unless it is GRAS or prior
sanctioned, is a food additive which therefore adulterates food if
no regulation approves its presence. 272
A processed food containing any residue of a pesticide for
which the EPA has not established a tolerance on the raw commodity is adulterated under section 402(a)(2)(C) of the Act. 273 But if such a tolerance has been established, Congress dispenses
with the requirement that the pesticide in the processed food also
be approved under section 409-if certain conditions are met. 274
These conditions are set out in a proviso to section 402(a)(2)(C),
which was added in 1958 and states:
Provided, That where a pesticide chemical has been used in or on
a raw agricultural commodity in conformity with an exemption
granted or a tolerance prescribed under section 408 and such raw
agricultural commodity has been subjected to processing such as
canning, cooking, freezing, dehydrating, or milling, the residue of
such pesticide chemical remaining in or on s~ch processed food
shall, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 406 and 409, not
be deemed unsafe if such residue in or on the raw agricultural
commodity has been removed to the extent possible in good manufacturing practice and the concentration of such residue in the
processed food when ready to eat is not greater than the tolerance
prescribed for the raw agricultural commodity . . . .275

The Act thus condones pesticide residues for which a tolerance
has been established if that tolerance is not exceeded when the
raw commodity is processed. This means that if the EPA estab270. See Cancer-Causing Chemicals-Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1978).
271. See note 262 supra and accompanying text.
272. See text at notes 113-39 supra.
273. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1976).
274. The legislative history of the 1958 Food Additive Amendments does not explain
why Congress chose to exempt pesticide residues on processed foods. Presumably it concluded that the evaluation of safety performed under § 408 adequately protected consumers so long as the amount of residue did not exceed that authorized for the raw commodity.
But no evidence -suggests that Congress was sensitive to the fact that the applicable
criteria for evaluation under§§ 408 and 409 are not the same.
275. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1976).
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lishes a finite tolerance for a carcinogenic pesticide on a raw
commodity, that pesticide may lawfully appear in the processed
food in a quantity that does not exceed the tolerance-"notwithstanding," as the proviso states, the Delaney
Clause.
One further example illustrates the exquisite, if arcane, relationship between section 409 and the provisions of the Act applicable to pesticides. Although processing may reduce the residues
of a pesticide on a raw commodity, it may sometimes concentrate
the residues by shrinking the volume of solid material. 270 When
this occurs, the proviso to section 402(a)(2)(C) is not satisfied and
the quantity of the pesticide that exceeds the section 408 tolerance is considered a food additive. 277 In such a case, a distributor
of the processed food needs a food additive regulation to prevent
the food from being considered adulterated and, to obtain such a
regulation, must demonstrate, with reasonable certainty, that the
quantity of the pesticide is safe. 278 Many food additive regulations
authorizing concentrated pesticide residues have been promulgated by the EPA, which is also responsible for implementing this
facet of the Food Additives Amendment because it is familiar
with the safety data submitted to support tolerances under section 408. 279
Suppose that the EPA established a tolerance for a pesticide
on raw cabbage at ten parts per million. Suppose further that the
pesticide induces cancer in animals but, because of its importance in controlling crop pests, :the EPA maintains its registration.
Under the proviso to section 402(a)(2)(C), up to ten parts per
million of this carcinogenic "additive" may lawfully appear in
food. But if residues of the pesticide concentrated during processing, any quantity in excess of ten parts per million would constitute an "unsafe food additive" and, under the Delaney Clause,
presumably could not be approved. 280 However, if the EPA were
to raise the tolerance for raw cabbage to a level that the residues
in the processed cabbage would not exceed, 281 in a legal sense the
276. Cancer-Causing Chemicals-Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Over•
sight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1978).
277. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1976).
278. See text at notes 112-28 supra.
279. See 21 C.F.R. § 193 (1978).
280. In administering§ 409 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the EPA is presumably bound by the Delaney Clause, as the FDA would be.
281. The EPA would of course have to determine that this higher level would meet
the more general safety criteria of§ 408 of the Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1976),
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food additive would disappear-and the Delaney Clause would
not preclude marketing the treated cabbage!
It should be noted that even a zero tolerance for a carcinogenic pesticide does not assure that no residues will appear on the
raw commodity or in processed food. Effective enforcement of a
zero tolerance depends on growers' and food producers' observance of meticulous processing standards and intensive FDA
monitoring. The FDA simply lacks the inspectional capability to
guarantee that no commodities containing measurable, and thus
illegal, pesticide residues reach consumers. Moreover, even lotby-lot monitoring would suffer from the limits of the analytical
methods for measuring pesticide residues. In reality, therefore, a
zero tolerance may be considered a finite tolerance, established
at the level that available analytical methods can measure. This
is true for any unintended constituent of food whose occurrence
cannot be effectively controlled or whose benefits are thought to
justify its continued use.
The procedure for obtaining a tolerance for pesticide residues
on a raw commodity resembles the procedure for obtaining approval of a food additive, with one significant difference. The
EPA on its own initiative may, or at the petitioner's request must,
submit the petition to an advisory committee of experts appointed by the National Academy of Sciences for evaluation and
recommendation. 282 The Act provides an opportunity for a formal
evidentiary hearing before the EPA may refuse to establish a
tolerance, although few petitioners have ever requested a hearing. 283 The EPA must follow the same procedures in revoking or
modifying a tolerance once established. When petitioned to
promulgate a food additive regulation authorizing a residue on
a processed food in excess of that sanctioned for the raw commodity, the EPA must follow the same procedures as those that
apply to the FDA. 284

N.

CONCLUSION

This Article describes the ways in which current federal law
attempts to assure that food is safe for human consumption. It
should be obvious even to the casual reader that safety, in this
case, is an objective, rather than a reality. The law's efforts to
make food safe are inevitably tempered by competing considera282. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(d)(3)(5) (1976).
283. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(d)(5) (1976).
284. See text at notes 132-39 supra.
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tions, such as a desire to retain traditional foods, the wish to
produce food abundantly and cheaply, and practical limitations
on our ability to detect or eliminate contaminants. As the preceding sections demonstrate, however, Congress has not simply instructed the FDA to attain the optimum mix of benefits and risks
in controlling consumer exposure to possibly toxic food constituents. Rather, Congress has divided the universe of food constituents into several categories, and specified different, occasionally
inconsistent, criteria for regulating each of them. In a fl;lw instances, these criteria reflect a definitive congressional assessment of the risks and benefits of a category of constituents as a
class. More often, they specify the primary objective-safetyand leave other considerations unmentioned.
In general, the Act's food safety requirements are intended
to minimize risk. Congress has usually instructed the FDA to
restrict or ban any food or food constituent that might expose any
significant number of consumers to a risk of harm-regardless,
presumably, of any countervailing benefits. But the qualifier,
"presumably," is important: Congress often appears to have ignored the question of competing benefits because it assumed that
few constituents of food, natural or added, would pose significant
risks. For example, in 1938 Congress probably believed that most
agricultural commodities-if adequately protected from manmade filth-would be perfectly safe for virtually all consumers. 285
The present law, however, is not naive. While the FDA has
sometimes had to interpret the Act imaginatively, 288 its general
structure reflects an awareness of the competing interests. The
285. Alternatively, Congress m~y simply have concluded that the interests involved
in producing agricultural commodities were so substantial that only a showing of a serious
risk could justify regulatory action against a staple of the American diet. Congress ob•
viously intended to make it more difficult for the FDA to regulate naturally occurring
constituents of familiar foods. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, it
could be said that many of the categories recognized by the current law reflect implicit
congressional risk-benefit judgments. For example, it is possible to interpret the statutory
definition of food additive-including the exceptions for GRAS substances and prior sanctioned ingredients-with § 409's high standard for approval as representing a similar riskbenefit judgment, in this instance a judgment that no synthesized new ingredient was
likely to prevent benefits that would justify any risk. To the extent that such policies must
be inferred from the structure of the statute, rather than stated in its terms and legislative
history, however, the present law can fairly be criticized for lack of candor.
286. The collection of provisions found in the original 1938 act-§§ 402(a)(l),
402(a)(2)(A), and 406-have posed the greatest challenge to the agency's ingenuity. No
theory of statutory construction can satisfactorily reconcile these provisions. The difficulties the FDA has encountered are apparent from its analysis in Poisonous or Deleterious
Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743 (1974). See notes
91-92 supra and accompanying text.
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central distinction between "added" and other constituents, I
suggest, recognizes both important differences in government's
ability to control exposure to constituents and in the "benefits"
that are popularly ascribed to various classes of foods. For example, I suspect that most consumers of potatoes would prefer them
to almost any synthesized source of carbohydrates containing
fewer potentially toxic constituents. Similarly, Congress's establishment of separate licensing systems for pesticide residues, food
and color additives, and animal drugs is not only a logical response to concerns about the risks posed by different classes of
"added" constituents, but might be adopted again if the law were
rewritten today. 287
That the Act permits the FDA to treat environmental contaminants as "added" to food may weaken the statute's candor,
but this arrangement grew largely from the FDA's desire to establish an administrative mechanism for determining the level of
exposure that is compatible with consumer health.and technological reality, rather than to leave the issue to individual judges in
suits to enforce the Act's general prohibition against adulterated
food. Whatever one thinks of the agency's handling of specific
contaminants, an approach to setting tolerances similar to the
one it has devised under section 406 seems a logical way to cope
with the probleiµ.
But though the Act can be considered rational in its general
structure, the current system for regulating food safety is under
enormous strain. The causes of this, I believe, require that consideration be given to revi,sing the current law. A subse.quent article
will describe the detailed features of a revised statute, but the
reasons for considering revision may be suggested here.
First, the public is increasingly aware that large numbers of
foods contain constituents that pose risks to health. This awareness comprehends that manufactured foods contain suspicious
chemical preservatives and other synthesized ingredients, and
that even natural constituents of home-grown fruits and vegetables may pose risks. And it recognizes the danger in the! growing
category of substances that become or, in the words of the Act,
287. While one might for administrative convenience retain separate statutory systems for regulating these constituents, there is little basis for the minor procedural differences that appear in the current provisions of the law. See notes 132-39, 229, 282-84 supra
and accompanying text. More fundamentally, as suggested below, text at note 288 infra,
there is no obvious reason why different substantive standards should apply to pesticide
residues, animal drugs, and food contact materials-"indirect" constituents that present
similar problems of control and provide comparable benefits.
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"may reasonably be expected to become," components of food
through their use in packaging, pest control, or livestock production. Second, although such generalizations are treacherous,
there is a popular appreciation of the benefits associated with
some of these risk-creating constituents. Certainly there is more
emphasis on developing and using technologies that make food
abundant, cheap, and easy to transport and prepare.
These developments complicate regulatory decisions, because they have not produced, nor been accompanied by, a national consensus about what kinds of benefits are important and
what kinds of risk are acceptable. Regional and ethnic differences
in diet have given way to strongly-held, widely dispersed preferences for special types of foods ranging from synthesized diet
foods to organically grown vegetables. Increasing variations in
dietary preferences have been accompanied by national production and marketing of food, which make it more difficult for individual consumers to control the source of their foods, and more
difficult for government regulators to identify the mix of benefits
and risks that will satisfy the majority of the population. Furthermore, regulation abhors diversity. It is difficult for an agency to
develop, and more difficult for it to implement, a policy that
permits regional or social disparities in levels of individual exposure to risk. And it would be virtually impossible to justify such
a policy in the Washington environment, where the insistent
demand is to protect the most vulnerable.
The strains on the present system stem also from basic flaws,
both substantive and procedural, in the law itself. While the Act's
dichotomy between added and naturally occurring constituents
may make sense, within categories of constituents the statute
i:ecognizes distinctions that cannot be justified as sound policy,
and that allow the threshold classification of a substance to dictate its regulatory fate. For example, the Act divides the broad
category of intentional ingredients into those used to color foods
and those used for other purposes. The Color Additive Amendments establish a "positive list" system for regulating food colors:
no color may be used which the FDA has not approved, following
testing by the users. The Food Additives Amendment, by contrast, exempts ingredients that are GRAS, makes no provision for
transition to food additive status, and provides apparently indefinite protection for ingredients once approved, however, casually,
by the FDA or the USDA.
The distinction among the three primary categories of indirect food constituents-pesticide residues, indirect food addi-
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tives, and animal drugs-are perhaps even less justifiable. In
establishing tolerances for pesticides on raw commodities, the
EPA may, and does, consider economic benefits. No such inquiry
is permitted in regulating an indirect food additive. And the FDA
maintains, I believe correctly, that the benefits of an animal drug
may not lawfully be considered in deciding how much, if any, of
it may remain in human food. 288 The disparities are even more
exquisite when one considers the Delaney Clause. The clause does
not prevent the approval of a carcinogen in the form of a pesticide
residue. Nor does it prohibit the approval of a _carcinogenic
animal drug, so long as any residue in food escapes detection.
But the clause unequivocally forbids the approval of any carcinogenic packaging material that may conceivably migrate to food.
All of these substances are used to enhance food production, handling, or storage. If a residue contaminates food, it makes no
difference, in terms of human risk, where the residue came from.
And no one of these sources is notably difficult to control or more
costly to forgo.
The Delaney Clause produces strain of its own as the dispute
over saccharin reveals. While one may argue the principle of Delaney-either as an operational statement of scientific knowledge
or as a way of preventing the FDA from succumbing to the pressures of food producers-it causes problems because it applies
unevenly. A prior sanction can reprieve a vulnerable, but important carcinogen, such as sodium nitrite. Similarly, calling an
added substance "unavoidable" may qualify it for more flexible
treatment under section 406. And I have already alluded to the
different ways in which Delaney applies to indirect constituents
of food. The exceptions to Delaney in, or read into, the Act exert
enormous pressure to find an escape route when an important
substance is discovered to be an animal carcinogen.
Another flaw in the present statute is its consistent failure
to define the FDA's authority to consider criteria other than risk.
Section 402(a) is a case in point. The Act does not indicate
whether, in determining whether a food naturally containing a
288. See Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203, at 17,075 where the Commissioner observed that, aside from §§ 406 and 408, "the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act contains no provision requiring the Commissioner to consider costs or technical
feasibility in making any safety decision, including any decision involving cancer-causing
chemicals..••" After analyzing the so-called DES proviso, the Commisioner concluded:
From this statutory structure and language, it is evident that any consideration
of feasibility and costs is subsidiary to the overriding congressional purpose to
permit no additional human cancer risk from food additives, color additives, or
animal drugs.
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toxic substance is likely to be "ordinarily injurious," the FDA
may consider the food's long use, its popularity, or its economic
importance. Presumably not, but the statute does not say, and
as more natural constituents are discovered to be toxic at some
level, the pressure on the FDA to give weight to these statutorily
extraneous, but obviously important, factors will increase. The
same point can be made about section 409 of the Act, which
specifies that the FDA must find a food additive safe and functional, but does not state whether other considerations may enter
into its judgment. Here the agency has been explicit; it will not
consider an additive's benefits in determining whether it satisfies
the basic safety standard. The Act's failure to specify the criteria
that the FDA may legitimately weigh invites ingenuity in statutory interpretation when a flat "no risk" standard seems likely to
produce an unpopular result.
The Act contains significant procedural flaws as well. The
variety of substantive standards governing food constituents is
paralleled by an even more striking variation among the statutorily prescribed procedures for reaching regulatory decisions. To
establish that a natural constituent renders a food "ordinarily
injurious" under the second clause of section 402(a)(l), the FDA
must marshal expert testimony in court to prove its contention
by a preponderance of the evidence. This process theoretically
must be repeated each time the agency seeks to enforce its view
against another distributor or shipment of the food. The Act does
not expressly authorize it to issue regulations defining the levels
of a natural constituent that will adulterate a food.
In regulating contaminants, by contrast, section 406 empowers the FDA to establish tolerances that determine conclusively
when a food is adulterated. Tolerances are set through formal
rulemaking under section 701(e) of the Act, a complex and costly
process which the United States Administrative Conference has
sharply criticized. 289 This procedure requires a proposal, opportunity for comment, publication of "final" regulation, opportunity for objections, and, if justified, a formal evidentiary hearing,
followed by an administrative law judge's initial decision and the
opportunity for an appeal to the Commissioner. Variations of this
process are prescribed for establishing pesticide tolerances and to
approving food additives, color additives, and animal drugs.
The foregoing description of the formal process overstates the
FDA's actual burden. A food distributor's inclination to assert its
289. See generally Hamilton, supra note 103.
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statutory right to a formal hearing depends largely on the consequences of a delay in the agency's decision and the costs of participating in the proceeding. It is extremely rare for a petitioner for
a food or color additive or a manufacturer of an animal drug to
insist upon a hearing when the FDA appears disinclined to approve its product for initial marketing. Ordinarily it is faster and
less expensive to conduct any additional tests the agency demands or to modify the use of the product to conform to the data
already submitted. Since 1938, no manufacturer of an animal
drug or petitioner for a new color additive has demanded a formal
hearing at the initial approval stage. Only two such requests have
been made for hearings on food additive petitions. 290 The EPA's
experience under section 408 is similar.
By contrast, when the Act requires an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing before the FDA can limit exposure to a product, e.g., before it may withdraw approval of an animal drug or
establish a tolerance for a contaminant, the incentives for distributors to insist upon the full procedures mandated by statute are
much greater. Hearings have been requested on the last two color
additives for which the FDA withdrew approval. 291 The manufacturers of DES have engaged the agency in a hearing on the proposed withdrawal of that compound for more than three years. 292
A requested hearing on the FDA's proposed toleranc~ for PCBs
in paper packaging has been pending for nearly five years while
the agency has attempted to forge a settlement that will avert the
formal statutory procedure. 293
290. The two instances involve cyclamate, for which a food additive petition was filed
several years after FDA's initial determination that it was no longer GRAS, and aspartame, another artificial sweetener, which the FDA originally approved, then delayed, for
marketing pending a hearing requested by two public opponents of its use, whose interest
lay in prolonging the administrative process. See notes 135-36, 155 supra and accompanying text.
291. The hearings involved FDC Red No. 2 and FDC Red No. 4. Technically, the .
hearing in each instance was on the FDA's refusal to permanently list the color. See 41
Fed. Reg. 15,053 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 41,867 (1976). Both colors had previously been
provisionally listed and in use since 1960. Thus, the practical effect of the agency's decision was to withdraw approval-and the predicted incentives to challenge the decisions
were operative. Because of the peculiar procedures applicable to provisionally listed colors, however, the FDA's decision in both instances became effective before the hearing was
held.
292. See note 240 supra and accompanying text. The proceeding commenced with the
publication of a notice of opportunity for hearing in January 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 1804
(1976), following a court decision ruling that the FDA's earlier attempt to withdraw
approval of the drug without a hearing was invalid. See Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia,
Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
293. The proceeding is described in Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in Paper
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The FDA's realization that a hearing will usually be requested when it will delay and possibly avert regulation has led
it to rely primarily on "action levels" to limit exposure to environmental contaminants. The agency asserts that a proposed tolerance may serve as an action level pending completion of formal
rulemaking294-and thereby escapes any pressure to finish setting
the tolerance. For many contaminants the FDA has relied exclusively on action levels, which are established simply by publication in the Federal Register. 295
The FDA has thus minimized the costs of the Act's procedural requirements, but it has done so at a price. The agency
makes most decisions to approve the use or occurrence of food
constituents without hearing public comment and often without
explaining the reasons for its judgments. It ordinarily approves
food additives simply by publishing in the Federal Register a
regulation specifying the terms of the approval and reciting that
the additive has been found safe. The supporting safety data are
evaluated privately, except on those rare occasions when a member of the public comes to the agency to evaluate the petition.
The process for approving new animal drugs is likewise effectively
closed to public review. When the FDA announces an action level
for a contaminant, it makes available the data supporting its
decision and permits access to its internal analysis of risk, avoidability, and detectability, but it accepts no responsibility to respond to any comments it might receive. 296
Neither Congress nor the FDA has seriously explored regulatory options other than mandatory limitations on exposure· to
potentially toxic constituents of food. Notably, the Act in most
instances does not contemplate the possibility that label warnings or another form of consumer information might be a more
discriminating means of regulating consumer exposure. 207 For
example, neither section 409's general safety clause nor the Delaney Clause appears to permit the FDA to allow the use of a
possibly toxic but useful additive, accompanied by label warnings
Food-Packaging Material; Order Ruling on Objections and Hearing Regarding Temporary
Tolerance, 40 Fed. Reg. 11°,563 (1975).
294. See 21 C.F.R. § 109.6(d) (1978).
295. Id. at§ 109.4(b)(2); 42 Fed. Reg. 52,817 (1977).
296. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances, 21 C.F.R. § 109.4(b)(2); 42 Fed. Reg.
52,814, 52,817 (1977).
297. For a more detailed, though ultimately unconvincing, discussion of the possible
range of regulatory approaches, including labeling, see Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, Food Safety Policy: Scientific and Societal Considerations
8-1 through 8-13 (1979).
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on the product. The agency has proposed to do this in the case of
hair dyes containing 4-methoxy-m-phenylenediamine, an animal
carcinogen, but its proposal clearly indicates that this approach
is a second best alternative to banning the substance altogether,
which the Act does not allow. 298 The difficulty of devising a genuinely informative label for potentially hazardous constituents,
such as saccharin, while protecting consumers who cannot or simply do not read labels, may ultimately force abandonment of this
approach, but it is one that merits investigation.
This Article does not purport to solve the problems raised by
the Act's treatment of toxic substances in food. I reserve specific
recommendations for the Act's revision for a subsequent article.
At this juncture I will simply conclude with suggested objectives
for statutory reform. First, any new system for regulating food
safety must explicitly recognize the special role that food plays
in our society. Food provides the nutrients essential for health,
but it also underpins many important traditions and accompanies many important ceremonies. Modest risks associated with
foods that have little importance for most consumers ought to be
considered more serious than greater hazards in foods that enjoy
a long acceptance. A system of regulation that attempts to ration
exposure to risks in food based solely on some mathematical formula will quickly encounter problems that it cannot resolve.
Second, any new system must explicitly recognize the government's inability to obtain complete information about risk or
benefits before a regulatory choice must be made. Adequate data
can be obtained about the safety of compounds that are not yet
in use and which have commercial sponsors. But problems loom
as soon as a compound is approved and become more serious as
scientific advances erode the original grounds for approval.
Shortage of data becomes most serious when the government
attempts to control constituents whose presence in food is not
desired or readily controllable, and for which, therefore, there
are no petitioners. The FDA must often determine the marketability of contaminated food long before data are available to
support definitive judgment. Yet its initial judgment must be
definitive, at least for the moment, if the agency is to control
human exposure effectively. And its decisions must be subject
to revision without substantial cost and delay.
Third, any revised system should simplify the procedures for
reaching regulatory decisions and force regulators to explain the
298. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1101 (1978) and note 232 supra.
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scientific bases and policies that underlie their determinations.
Finally, Congress should exhaustively describe the criteria
regulators may consult and should specify those that are to be
ignored. No regulator should be left to determine without legislative guidance whether consumers want cheaper peanut butter
and more aflatoxin, more expensive fish and a re(\uction in exposure to PCBs and mercury, or artificially sweetened soft drinks
accompanied by a heightened risk of bladder cancer.

